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This dissertation has attempted to provide a contribution to expanding the 
literature on both the theory and application of noncooperative R&D by introducing a 
class of games in which asymmetric spillovers are determined by the level of technology 
of the players. In particular, we consider the case where the follower is more likely to 
benefit from such spillovers as compared to the industry leader.  
The first essay provides a general framework in which to analyze the relationship 
between R&D investment and technology catch-up in a differential game and shows that 
the dynamics of the technology gap play a crucial role in determining whether spillovers 
necessarily reduce the leader’s incentives to invest in R&D. The results provide a 
sufficient condition for the existence of a steady state in R&D games with spillovers; a 
finding that is new in the literature. 
The second essay presents an application of the theoretical framework by 
studying the effects of process spillovers on competition in a R&D based endogenous 
growth model. It finds, firstly, that the innovation strategies of the two firms can be 
dynamically strategic complements if a large technology gap prevails and, secondly, that 
there is a case for process reverse engineering as a fall in the level of appropriability may 
result in higher growth.  
The purpose of the third essay is to determine the effects of process R&D 
spillovers on growth by extending the well-known AHV framework. It demonstrates, 
without relaxing the assumption of product homogeneity, that competitive behavior can 
still prevail in a Cournot quantity competition setting. Two main factors drive 
vi 
8 
competitive behavior in the long-run; firstly, the R&D levels in the neck-and-neck state 
and, secondly, spillovers occurring due to a lack of appropriability.  
The final essay offers a conceptual framework for understanding the role played 
by spillovers in determining the optimal product and process innovation in a duopoly 
with a leader-follower configuration. It addresses the question of whether higher 
spillovers favor more process or more product innovation and contributes to the existing 
literature by showing that it is always optimal for firms to invest more in product 
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I. General Introduction 
 
One of the most important applications of the Cournot model can be found in the 
“R&D” branch of the industrial organization literature.  By applying the logic of two 
stage Cournot games, D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) made a seminal contribution 
to the analysis of strategic R&D investment in a duopoly with spillovers. While 
subsequent work by Henriques (1990) and Simpson and Vonortas (1994) highlighted the 
importance of spillovers in R&D games, Amir, Estignev and Wooders (2003) were the 
first to endogenize spillovers in the underlying framework. This dissertation introduces 
an element of asymmetry to the structure of intra-industry spillovers by developing a 
class of noncooperative R&D games in which the nature of the endogenity of such 
spillovers turns on the level of technology gap between the two firms. Although some 
research in the theory of economic growth, such as that by Peretto (1996), has shown that 
the relationship between R&D investment and technology gap is non-linear, this thesis 
pioneers the study of the technology gap in strategic R&D games with spillovers.  In a 
series of essays, the dissertation provides both a theoretical framework and some 
applications of R&D games with asymmetric endogenous spillovers. 
The first essay develops a theoretical framework in which a class of dynamic 
noncooperative R&D games in a duopolistic industry with spillovers and technology gap 
is considered. In so doing, we examine the extent to which the firm’s R&D investment 
decision is affected by the size of spillovers in the industry. In contrast to previous 
studies, in which the spillovers are considered to be exogenously given, we allow such 
externalities to be endogenously determined by the magnitude of the technology gap 
between the two firms. To this end, we propose a dynamic two stage analysis of a 
2 
noncooperative game in an asymmetric duopoly. Research efforts, which precede 
production, are directed to reducing unit cost. While the technological efficiency of the 
leader firm depends only on its own investment, that of the laggard firm is partly subject 
to endogenous spillovers. Using a general framework to analyze the relationship between 
R&D investment and technology catch-up in a differential game, we show that the 
dynamics of the technology gap play a crucial role in determining whether spillovers 
necessarily reduce the leader’s incentives to invest in R&D, and we derive a sufficient 
condition for the existence of a steady state in R&D games with spillovers. Our results 
suggest that in the presence of spillovers the leader will always increase its R&D 
investment as long as the technology gap does not converge to zero.  
In the second essay we provide an application of the theoretical model. 
Specifically, we develop a non-Schumpeterian endogenous growth model of R&D in 
which the firm’s free-riding behavior, reinforced by a lack of appropriability in its 
industry, constitutes a major source of growth in the economy. While models analyzing 
the interaction between either imitation and innovation or spillovers and innovation have 
already appeared in the literature, we show how imitation via free-riding behavior and 
spillovers can mutually promote dynamic competition and hence economic growth. The 
representative industry, which is of duopolistic market structure, comprises a leader who 
innovates and a laggard who free-rides by exploiting the source of intra-industry 
spillover. We find firstly that the innovation strategies of the two firms can be 
dynamically strategic complements if a large technology gap prevails and, secondly, that 
there is a case for process reverse engineering as a fall in the level of appropriability 
results in higher growth. 
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The third essay considers another application of the class of models discussed in 
the first essay by looking at a more robust equilibrium concept that is, closed-loop 
equilibrium. The paper extends previous research on the effects of process imitation on 
economic growth by accounting for stochastic intra-industry spillovers. We employ a 
non-Schumpeterian growth model to determine the impact of such spillovers on 
investment in industries where firms are either neck-and-neck or unleveled. Our central 
finding is that, in an economy where the representative industry is a duopoly, R&D 
spillovers positively affect growth. While other non-Schumpeterian models assume that 
the imitation rate of laggard firms is unaffected by the R&D effort of the leader firm, we 
consider the case where the latter’s R&D activity generates some positive externality on 
its rivals’ research. In this construct, the duopolists in each industry play a two-stage 
game. In the first stage, they invest in R&D which can reduce their costs of production 
only if they successfully innovate and they compete with each other by using Markovian 
strategies. In the second stage, they compete in the product market. At any point in time, 
an industry can either be in the neck-and-neck state or in an unleveled state where the 
leader is n steps ahead of the follower. At the steady state, the inflow of firms to an 
industry must be equal to the outflow. By determining the steady state investment levels 
of each insutry, we demonstrate a positive monotonic relationship between the spillover 
rate and economic growth.                                                                                                                                   
In the last essay we provide a simple static example of an R&D game when both 
product and process innovations are possible. The paper proposes a conceptual 
framework for analyzing how process spillovers can impact on a firm’s decision to 
choose its levels of process and product innovation. In contrast to previous work which 
4 
considers the interrelation between process and product R&D in a duopoly with no 
spillovers, we extend the existing literature by introducing process spillovers. A two-
stage analysis of a non-cooperative game which entails both demand enhancing product 
innovation and cost-reducing process innovation in an asymmetric duopoly is developed. 
While the leader’s technological efficiency depends only on its own R&D investment, the 
follower’s productivity depends also on the level of intra-industry spillovers. In the first 
stage, the duopolists choose their levels of product and process innovations, while in the 
second stage they compete in the product market. The results obtained confirm the 
findings highlighted by previous studies that both product and process innovations are 
strategic substitutes. However, we offer an additional insight in that it is always optimal 
for the firms to invest more in product innovations when the rate of spillover falls. This 
new result is important as it portrays the spillover rate as the decisive factor determining 
the level of product innovation vis-à-vis process innovation. 
The four essays, by exploiting the heterogeneity of process spillovers in industries 
where firms are of different stages of technological development, explain the strategic 














In this paper we examine the extent to which the firm’s R&D investment decision 
is affected by the size of spillovers in a duopolistic industry. In contrast to previous 
studies, in which the spillovers are considered to be exogenously given, we allow such 
externalities to be endogenously determined by the magnitude of the technology gap 
between the two firms. To this end, we propose a dynamic two stage analysis of a 
noncooperative game in an asymmetric duopoly. Research efforts, which precede 
production, are directed to reducing unit cost. While the technological efficiency of the 
leader firm depends only on its own investment, that of the laggard firm is partly subject 
to endogenous spillovers. Using a general framework to analyze the relationship between 
R&D investment and technology catch-up in a differential game, we show that the 
dynamics of the technology gap play a crucial role in determining whether spillovers 
necessarily reduce the leader’s incentives to invest in R&D, and we derive a sufficient 
condition for the existence of a steady state in R&D games with spillovers. Our results 
suggest that in the presence of spillovers the leader will always increase its R&D 
investment as long as the technology gap does not converge to zero.  
 
Keywords: process innovation, one-way endogenous spillovers, technology gap, dynamic 
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It has been well established that when one firm independently develops a cost 
reducing innovation, the firm’s competitors benefit in the sense that they can use the 
innovation to reduce their own costs. When such spillover effects are significant, 
noncooperative firms might be expected to research too little from the standpoint of 
the industry since each firm tends to ignore the positive externality which its research 
generates on the cost of its rival firm (see D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), 
Henriques (1990) and Simpson and Vonortas (1994)). However, when spillovers are 
endogenous it is also observed that the firm’s disincentive to engage in R&D activity 
is partially offset because its own R&D can potentially enhance its capacity to absorb 
its rival’s technology (see Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998), Kultti and Takalo (1998), 
Kamien and Zang (2000) and Grunfeld (2003)). Moreover, reduced costs of rival 
firms due to spillovers will lead all firms to compete more intensively in the product 
market. Empirical findings by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) reinforce the fact that 
spillovers have two opposing effects on R&D investment in strategic games: firstly, 
they increase the firm’s incentive to raise its own R&D and, secondly, they create a 
disincentive for the rival firm to invest in R&D as free riding becomes a better 
strategy. A possible explanation for this behavior is that there exists a threshold level 
of spillovers beyond which the firm has no incentive to increase its R&D activities. 
The purpose of this paper is to show how the dynamics of the technology gap 
between firms helps demarcate the opposing effects of spillovers on R&D incentives. 
Our work is motivated by issues originating from the empirical findings of Cameron 
(1999) who observed that as the technological gap between the leader and the 
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follower narrows, the latter must undertake more formal R&D owing to the 
exhaustion of imitation possibilities. Also, Peretto (1996) showed that the relationship 
between R&D investment and technology gap is non-linear; that is, when the gap is 
large the follower enjoys increasing returns to imitation or reverse engineering1 and 
when the gap becomes smaller, there are decreasing returns to such activities. While 
taking into account such observations, we explore the theoretical link between 
spillovers as pioneered by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) (henceforth AJ) and 
technology gap by allowing the rate of spillovers to depend on the latter.2 Intuitively, 
when the follower lags far behind the leader it enjoys larger spillovers and has fewer 
incentives to conduct its own R&D, but as it moves closer to the frontier3 it is 
“forced” to innovate as its free riding possibility set becomes smaller. Thus if there 
exists a relationship between spillovers and R&D incentives an analogous link must 
also exist between the latter and the level of technology gap. 
In order to demonstrate the relationship between technology gap and R&D 
incentives, we develop a two stage game of process R&D and output competition for 
an ex-ante asymmetric duopoly with one-way spillovers.4 In the model, at the first 
stage the two firms conduct process R&D and in the second stage, they compete in 
Cournot fashion in the product market. We go one step further than Katsoulacos and 
                                                 
1 For the follower, imitation is a better strategy than innovation as the positive externality created by the 
leader’s research makes learning and reverse engineering easier. However, when all gains from such 
spillovers have been extracted, the follower might find it more profitable to innovate. 
2 While more recent studies have attempted to endogenize spillovers in an AJ framework (see Amir, 
Estignev and Wooders (2003)), this is the first attempt to show that the nature of such endogenity turns on 
the level of technology gap between the two firms. 
3 The frontier is defined as the level of technological efficiency of the leader firm. 
4 In contrast to the traditional AJ framework in which both firms benefit from spillovers, we consider the 
case in which only the follower can free ride off the leader. Amir and Wooders (2000) also consider one-
way spillovers in a two stage game of process R&D. 
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Ulph (1998) and Kultti and Takalo (1998) who were the first5 to endogenize 
spillovers in an AJ framework. Our R&D spillover function does not depend solely 
on the absorptive capacity effect as in the latter studies since it also takes into account 
the size of the technology gap between the two firms. We seek to extend existing 
theoretical framework by incorporating the impact of such endogenous spillovers on 
the benefits and the costs of R&D.6The effect of the spillovers on the cost of 
undertaking R&D has the following interpretation. Assuming that the spillover rate is 
endogenous (positively related to the size of the technology gap), then the further 
away the firm is from the frontier, the less technologically efficient it is, that is; it 
finds it more costly to undertake R&D when the technology  gap is large. Hence, 
firms operating well within the frontier incur greater costs of doing research since the 
size of the technology gap (or endogenized spillover) is large. 
Given this link between spillovers and technology gap, we consider the dynamic 
version of a two stage R&D game since we cannot observe changes in the magnitude 
of the gap over time in a static model. We derive our results based on the steady state 
values of R&D as well as on their transitional dynamic paths. Finally, we provide a 
general framework for analyzing dynamic two stage R&D games with endogenous 
spillovers. We present three different (though non-mutually exclusive) sets of results. 
First, we present a variant of the static AJ model with one-way endogenous7 
spillovers. We show that the existence of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
                                                 
5 Subsequent attempts to endogenize spillovers in an AJ framework have been made by Kamien and Zang 
(2000), Amir, Evstignev and Wooders (2003) and Grunfeld (2003). 
6 In the current literature, while spillovers increase the benefits of the firm’s R&D by reducing its costs of 
production by an amount proportional to its rival’s investments, they do not affect the cost of undertaking 
R&D.  
7 We assume that the marginal cost of production of the follower also depends on the technology gap 
between the leader and itself. The AJ model will be the special case where the technology gap reduces to 
zero. 
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(SPNE) requires that the level of spillovers to be low and the initial marginal cost to 
be high. We show that the relationship between the free-riding behavior of the 
laggard and the level of spillovers is non-monotonic. We observe that they are 
positively related as long as the size of spillovers is small.      
Secondly, we develop a dynamic version of the latter model in a differential game 
setting. It is shown that if each firm in the industry takes into account the dynamic 
strategic response of its rival, results can be derived by looking at the transitional 
dynamics of the firms’ reaction functions in the neighborhood of the steady state. 
While in low cost industries8, we find that there exists no steady state with complete 
catch-up9, in high cost industries we observe that there exists a unique and stable 
steady state with complete catch-up (ex-post symmetry).Lastly, we provide a general 
framework for analyzing dynamic AJ models with one-way endogenous spillovers. 
We derive some general conditions that would guarantee the existence of a steady 
state in a more general class of two stage R&D games with spillovers. In doing so, we 
also outline the cases when R&D spillovers can act as a deterrent to future research. 
Our contribution to the literature might be described as follows. While recent 
attempts to endogenize spillovers in the AJ paradigm take into account the firm’s 
absorptive capacity only, we show, by introducing the concept of technology gap, that 
the follower firm’s incremental R&D effort does not only enhance its capacity to 
learn (by reducing its own R&D costs) but also, after some point in time, begins to 
reduce its marginal benefits too.10 This is due to decreasing returns to scale to 
                                                 
8 Here we refer to the marginal cost of production. 
9 By complete catch-up we mean that the technology gap equals zero. 
10 Kamien and Zang (2000) emphasize that the followers themselves must invest in R&D in order to take 
advantage of the R&D innovations of others (the absorptive capacity effects). 
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imitation or reverse engineering activities. Thus the follower firm benefits more from 
the spillovers when the technology gap is large than when it is small; in other words, 
the laggard’s marginal benefits from the spillovers decrease in the level of the 
technology gap. Also, its cost of R&D falls as the gap becomes smaller due to the 
absorptive capacity effect. In view of the key role that spillovers play in the current 
two stage R&D game literature, we believe that it necessary to ascertain whether the 
existing results remain robust to a more general version of one-way endogenous 
spillovers. Moreover, our framework will nicely capture the notion that both the R&D 
benefits and costs of a lagging firm change with its research expenditure when the 
technology gap is endogenized. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some 
background literature. Section 3 presents a static version of the AJ model with one 
way spillovers. In Section 4 we study the dynamic version of the AJ model. A general 











2. Related Work 
 In this section, we provide a brief overview of relevant studies. Our contribution 
builds on D’Aspremont and Jacquemin’s (AJ) (1988) simple model of symmetric 
duopoly of R&D. The authors compare several equilibrium concepts (the two stage 
noncooperative solution, the two stage mixed game solution, the two stage fully 
cooperative solution and the socially optimal solution) in a static two stage game 
theoretic setting. Two important features of their model are the exogenous nature of 
spillovers and the range of values of the spillover rate for which the Cournot-Nash 
equilibrium values of output and R&D are stable. Clearly, assumptions on the level or 
nature of spillovers can affect results significantly in R&D models with externalities. It is 
therefore important to treat such spillovers as important determinants of R&D rather than 
just an exogenously given parameter.  
Henriques (1990) shows that for very small spillovers the AJ model’s comparison 
between the pure cooperative and pure noncooperative games does not hold because the 
noncooperative model would be unstable. This highlighted the importance of setting 
proper parameter restrictions in accordance to the relevant existence and stability 
requirements in standard R&D models. Henriques also proposed that this could be 
achieved by choosing a feasible range of values of the spillover rate for which stability 
would be guaranteed.11Other related studies by Suzumura (1992) and Simpson and 
Vonortas (1994) have compared the noncoopertive regime with the cooperative one in 
terms of social efficiency. They found that, while both the noncoopertive and cooperative 
levels of R&D are suboptimal in the presence of spillovers, the noncoopertive level might 
overshoot the socially optimum level in the absence of spillovers. Given the important 
                                                 
11 Henriques found that the stability conditions can be met if and only if the spillovers are not too small. 
12 
part played by spillover in the above literature, we propose to conceptualize such 
spillovers in a somewhat more general approach in order to shed some light on the 
mechanism by which they affect R&D decisions.12  
While the above studies model the firm’s cost reductions by the sum of its own 
autonomous R&D and a proportion of the rival’s R&D, Kamien , Muller and Zang (1992) 
measure the spillover effect in terms of  R&D dollar expenditure.13Our reliance on the 
technology gap to explain the endogenity of spillovers makes ex-ante asymmetry an 
important necessary feature of our model; that is, there always exists a leader and a 
follower configuration at least initially. One way to incorporate such asymmetry in the AJ 
framework is to consider the case where only the follower can free-ride off the leader. 
Amir and Wooders (1999) show that it is possible that the standard symmetric two 
periods R&D model with one-way spillovers leads to an asymmetric equilibrium when  
there is an endogenous imitator/ innovator configuration. They argue that know-how may 
only flow from the more R&D intensive firm to its rival but never in the opposite 
direction. Moreover, in contrast to the existing literature they use a stochastic spillover 
process and their findings indicate that the extent of the firms’ heterogeneity depends on 
the spillover rate. They also show that an optimal cartel might seek to minimize the 
spillovers between members. In another study with similar settings, Amir and Wooders 
(2000) explain the existence of the imitator/ innovator pattern in some industries by using 
the one-way spillover structure. Furthermore, they demonstrate how the concept of 
                                                 
12 Although most studies of the current literature compare the cooperative and the noncooperative R&D 
levels with the socially optimal level, we only look at the noncooperative case as the dynamic version of 
the cooperative case might require further assumptions. 
13 Kamien , Muller and Zang (KMZ)’s  (1992)  R&D specification is another way ( distinct from AJ) of 
modeling knowledge externalities. Amir (2000) gives a detailed comparison and a critique of the two 
frameworks. He also shows the conditions under which equivalence would hold between the two models. 
13 
submodularity can be used in the same framework to provide a general analysis of R&D 
games. 
Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) were the first to endogenize spillovers in the two 
stage R&D game. In contrast to previous works which considered the spillover rate as 
purely exogenous when comparing the cooperative case with the nocooperative regime, 
they focus on the impact of research joint ventures on innovative performance. They 
argue that “it seems somewhat odd to treat a component of this (innovative performance) 
– the flow of spillovers from one firm to another – as purely exogenous”. They find that 
either maximal or minimal spillovers will be chosen in a noncooperative setting while 
partial spillovers are chosen in the cooperative case. The concept of endogenous 
spillovers is explored further by Kamien and Zang (2000), who argue that the firm cannot 
capture any spillovers from its rival without engaging in R&D itself. By incorporating 
absorptive capacity as a strategic variable, they distinguish between two components of 
spillovers; an exogenous component which represents involuntary spillovers from the 
firm’s R&D activity and an endogenous component that allows the firm to exert control 
over spillovers. They find that if firms choose identical R&D approaches14in the first 
stage, they would cooperate in the setting of their respective R&D budgets, while if they 
choose firm specific R&D approaches in the first stage they will not form a research joint 
venture.  Slight changes in the treatment of spillovers can, therefore, alter the results in 
the two stage R&D game. 
More recently, a dynamic feedback game with endogenous absorptive capacity 
has been developed by Campisi , Mancuso and Nastasi (2001) that derives the existence 
and uniqueness of  Nash equilibrium conditions in a feedback R&D game with spillovers. 
                                                 
14 R&D approach refers to the firm’s choice of the extent of spillovers it allows its rival to enjoy. 
14 
However, although they take into account the effects of absorptive capacity, they assume 
the spillover rate to be constant over time and conclude, not surprisingly, that variations 
in such externalities hardly affect the firm’s R&D investments even if its capacity to 
exploit such knowledge were to be endogenous. Another study which links learning 
capacity to spillovers was conducted by Martin (2002).  Although his objective is 
primarily to distinguish between input spillovers (as in KMZ) and imperfect 
appropriability (as in AJ), his findings, that the firm’s value is maximized with complete 
appropriability, and results which remain robust when the model is extended to allow for 
endogenous absorptive capacity are helpful to our study. 
Grunfeld (2003) shows that contrary to Kamien and Zang’s (2000) findings, 
absorptive capacity effects of the firm’s own R&D do not necessarily drive up their 
investment incentives. Moreover, he argues that learning effects affect the critical rate of 
spillovers which would determine whether a research joint venture generates more R&D 
investment than in a noncooperative setting. An important feature of their study is that 
they highlight the two opposing effects of absorptive capacity created by R&D 
investment. In a generalized version of R&D games with endogenous spillovers, Amir, 
Evstignez and Wooders (2003) capture nicely the scope for cooperative behavior by 
endogenizing the value of the spillover rate and show, by providing a sufficient condition 
for such an outcome, that firms would always choose extremal spillovers. 
Our work is also related to some studies in the area of dynamic games. Ruff 
(1969) was the first to consider R&D dynamic game in an infinite horizon Cournot 
economy in which firms choose R&D efforts in the presence of spillovers. He compared 
the noncooperative solution to the cooperative and the socially optimal ones and his 
15 
conclusions support the Schumpeterian view that dynamic performance is more important 
than static efficiency. Reinganum (1982) developed an R&D differential game to derive 
the dynamic optimal allocation of R&D and found that the availability of perfect 
information accelerates the development of innovations and that the impact of rivalry on 
Nash equilibrium investment will depend on the appropriablity level (the spillover rate in 
our model). Recent developments in Non-Schumpeterian growth models by 
Vencatachellum (1998) and Traca and Reis (2003) show that dynamic interactions 
between firms ought to be incorporated into the micro foundations of dynamic general 
equilibrium models. 
By allowing the spillover rate to be endogenously dependent on the level of the 
technology gap between firms, this paper augments the widely used AJ model in several 
important ways. It explores further the asymmetry which one-way spillovers can generate 
while taking seriously the notion of absorptive capacity (as in Katsoulacos and Ulph 
(1998)). Moreover it introduces a time variant technology gap in a differential game to 
show under which conditions R&D spillovers crowd out research incentives and when 
they do not. It is also to be noted that in contrast to the current literature, we do not 
consider the cooperative and socially optimal cases as we focus only on the 







3. D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (AJ) Revisited – The Static Case 
In this section we look at the augmented version of the AJ model. Consider an 
industry with a duopolistic market structure in which two firms (firm 1 and firm 2) 
engage in a two stage R&D game. At the first stage, firms 1 and 2 conduct process R&D 
by choosing their research intensity (the amount by which they reduce their costs of 
production) 1X  and 2X  respectively. In the second stage, the firms compete in Cournot 
fashion in the product market. As in AJ we assume that the demand faced by the two 
rivals is linear with the slope -1.15 The demand schedule is given by 
QAP −=   , where 2,1,, −≠+= ijiqqQ ji  , and iq  is the output of firm i. (1) 
We impose an ex-ante asymmetry between the two firms both on the marginal 
benefit and on the cost of their R&D. In particular, on the marginal benefit (or marginal 
cost reduction) side of R&D, we assume a one-way spillover structure in which only firm 
1, the “follower”16 can benefit from spillovers from firm 2, the “leader”, but not vice-
versa. Moreover, the spillover rate depends positively on the technology gap between the 
two firms. On the cost side of R&D, we assume that the firm benefiting from spillovers 
(the follower) incurs a higher R&D cost than the leader. Also, the larger the technology 
gap between the two firms, the higher the R&D cost of the follower. In other words, our 
assumption states that while free-riding opportunities reduce as the technology gap 
becomes smaller, so does the R&D cost for a follower firm. The per unit production 
marginal costs for the follower and the leader are given respectively by the following 
equations. 
211 XXCC β−−=            (2) 
                                                 
15 This does not lead to a loss of generality. 
16 Note that “leader” and “follower” are not used in the Stackelberg sense here. 
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22 XCC −=                    (3) 
where [ )CXX ,0, 21 ∈   







−≡β                                                             (4) 
where ( )1,0∈b  is the spillover parameter. We also impose the following parameter 
restriction  
AC >              (5) 
β  is the level of spillovers, due to the leader’s (firm 2) R&D, which accrues to the 
follower (firm 1). A crucial departure from the standard AJ framework is that there exists 
an asymmetry characterized by one-way spillovers. The leader’s marginal cost (3) is 
decreasing in the level of research that it undertakes and is ex-ante unaffected by the 
R&D of the follower. The latter’s per unit cost (2) is not only reduced by its own R&D 
effort but also by a proportion of that of the leader’s. The spillover parameterb , can 
account for involuntary leakage or voluntary exchange of technological information. One 
can also interpretb  as a parameter that is inversely related to the degree of patent 
protection or appropriability. The parameter restriction given by (5) implies the existence 
of large per unit marginal cost in the industry. It can be easily verified that if the R&D 
levels for both firms are zero, they will choose not to produce in the second stage. Thus, a 
minimum R&D level, at least by firm 2, is necessary to ensure a positive output in the 
product market. While our assumptions restrict our study only to industries where costs 
are large enough so that (5) is satisfied, they do not rule the possibility in which the 
                                                 
17 In the next section, we provide a formal way of deriving this expression. 
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optimal R&D levels for both firms are zero, so that they both do not produce in the 
second stage. Thus, the infinimum (zero) of the interval containing iX   for i=1, 2 is 
included in the interval. However, we assume that the initial marginal cost (without 
R&D) is so large that it is not feasible for firm i to undertake any R&D level iX such 
that CX i = . In other words, the supremum (C) of the interval containing iX  for i=1, 2 is 
not included in the interval. As a corollary, we also have CXX <+ 21 β for all 0≥β  and 
also that 01 >C  if 0<β . Therefore, it is never possible for firm i to reduce its marginal 
cost to zero in our setting and hence, unlike other AJ models in which the additive 
marginal benefit functions are unable to exclude the possibility of maximal costs 
reductions ( See Amir, 2000 ), our assumptions of large costs rule out this possibility. The 
firms R&D costs functions are assumed to be as follow, 
( ) ( ) 21&1 1 bXXCC DR ++= β   for firm 1        (6) 
( )2&2 XCC DR =  for firm 2              (7) 
where ( )⋅C   is  monotonically increasing in its argument                                      
 The R&D cost function of the follower (6) is new and a justification is warranted.  
The reason for having the term ( )β+1  in the follower’s R&D cost function is owing to 
the fall in its research costs when it approaches the technological frontier. It is not 
difficult to imagine β  as representing the distance between the technology levels of the 
two firms, in which case a higher (lower) β  will imply a larger (smaller) technology gap. 
Thus, initially, when the follower is a new entrant, β  is high and the marginal benefits of 
free riding are large. However, when its technological efficiency approaches that of the 
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leader, β  becomes lower and due to decreasing returns to imitation the marginal benefits 
begin to fall. Now, when the follower’s technology level approaches that of the leader, it 
must be the case that its R&D costs fall and gradually converge on that of the leader. 
Hence, while technology catch-up implies reductions in the benefits of free riding, it also 
lowers research costs. If 0=β it means that catch-up is complete as the follower’s and the 
leader’s marginal benefits and marginal costs of R&D become identical. If 0<β , the 
follower would have leapfrogged the leader and the marginal benefit of free riding would 
be negative ( the last term in the RHS of (2) becomes  greater or equal to zero so the total 
benefit due to spillovers is declining).Also, the cost of R&D of the follower also becomes 
smaller asβ   becomes more negative. The last term on the RHS of (6) shows that some 
learning or reverse engineering costs are incurred by the follower in order to benefit from 
the leader’s research. Thus we assume that the externalities accrued by the follower do 
not take the form of a pure public good. This assumption also implies that if it is optimal 
for the follower to free-ride completely on the leader, by choosing 01 =X , then it also has 
to bear some costs given by 2bX  . Models which employ the additive marginal benefit 
function as in  the AJ framework are often criticized for they cannot exclude the 
possibility that a firm can fully free-ride costlessly on its rival ( see Amir, 2000). The cost 
function given by (6) allows our model to survive the so-called Amir’s critique. 
Moreover, for simplicity, we shall assume that ( )iXC   for i=1, 2 is linear and is given 
by ( ) ii XXC = .18 This assumption which does not violate the quasi-concavity of the first 
                                                 
18 While a strictly convex cost function is one of the necessary ingredients to guarantee the existence of a 
maximum point in the AJ class of games, the endogenous spillover rate of our model makes this 
assumption redundant. In other, words, due to (4), usual parameter restrictions can be used to ensure the 
quasi –concavity of (11) and (12).Moreover, the Hessian matrix of (11) and (12) are found to be negative 
definite for some region of the parameter space. Poof can be provided upon request.  
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stage profit function will be relaxed in the next sections. It is also to be noteworthy that 
the underlying asymmetry (leader/ follower configuration) in our model is only observed 
through the marginal cost reduction and the R&D cost functions and that we do not 
impose the condition 12 XX > . Hence, even when the follower leapfrogs the leader so 
that 12 XX ≤ , the forms of the benefit and cost functions do not change. Thus, while the 
follower, being a new entrant with low R&D, can free-ride on the leader’s existing 
technology by incurring some costs, the leader in turn cannot learn or benefit from the 
laggard’s technology. Note that as b approaches 1, the technology gap is still less than 1. 
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage the firms choose their 
respective R&D levels iX  and in the second stage they choose their respective 
quantities iq . As is customary in the analysis of staged games, we work backwards from 
the last stage to the first. Thus the firm’s problem in the second stage is given by 
( )( ) jiiqCqqqAMax iiijiqi ≠=−+− ,2,1,        (8) 












CCA +−=π                                      (10) 
 (2), (3), (6), (7) and (10) imply that the first stage objective functions for the follower 
and the leader are given respectively by 








ββ +−−+−−−           for firm 1      (11) 
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−−−+−− β             for firm 2       (12) 
where β  is given by (4). 
The firms’ R&D reaction functions are given respectively by19 




































XXbCA      for firm 2          (14) 
Proof: 
See Appendix 
It can be shown that (13) simplifies to 























⎛ −−+−− XbbXXbXbXbCACA  
                                                       (15) 
We can now demonstrate our results via the following propositions. 
Proposition 3.1.1 
Assume that AC >  and b  is small, then 
(i) there exists a level of MX 2  beyond which 1X starts to fall, that is, there exists a 
level of the leader’s investment beyond which the laggard will start to free-ride. 
(ii) there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between b and MX 2∆− 20, that is, 
while free-riding increases with the spillover rate  initially, it becomes inversely 
related to the  spillover rate as the latter gets larger. 
                                                 





 By providing a key relationship between the free-riding and the spillover rate, 
Proposition 3.1.1 provides some theoretical support to the findings of Aghion et al. 
(2001) that there exists an inverted U-shaped relationship between imitation and 
innovation. As shown in the proof, there exists a cut-off value of the spillover rate 
b beyond which free-riding starts to fall. Thus, as pointed out by Cameron (1999) there 
are diminishing returns to scale to imitation. Intuitively, this happens when the follower 
has extracted all possible imitative possibilities from the leader. It is noteworthy that 
some computer generated simulations of the laggard’s reaction function also show the 
same result. (See Figures 1-4) 
                                          Figures 1 – 4 (About Here) 
Proposition 3.1.2 




As shown in the appendix, the derivation of Proposition 3.1.1 is based on the 
graphs of reaction functions (13) and (14). Since we have already assumed AC > from 
(5) and we know from the existence proof (see Appendix) that both firms choose some 
positive iX , the parameter value of C  can be chosen ex-post so that iX  for i=1,2 are 
                                                                                                                                                 
20 Note that MX 2∆−   (change in the maximum value of firm 2’s R&D) captures free-riding. 
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strictly less thanC .21 We also show that more than one (nonzero) fixed point can exist. 
Therefore in a leader/follower market configuration both firms will optimally undertake 
some minimum R&D as long as the spillover rate parameter is not too high and the initial 
marginal cost is not too low. This is not surprising as excess externalities might lead to a 
very low level of R&D effort by the follower who would rather free ride on the leader. As 

















                                                 
21 Note that this is possible since the upper bound (C) of iX  is not in the interior of the interval 
containing iX . 
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4. The Dynamic Case 
 In this section we shall exploit the fact that spillovers are endogenous, together 
with the dynamic nature of technology gap to extend the existing AJ framework. 
Subtracting (2) from (3), we can define the gap at time t as 
( ) ttt XXG 121 −−= β           (16) 
We shall assume22  that the spillover takes the following form 
( )1,0, ∈≡ bbGttβ                      (17) 
(17) implies a positive relationship between the spillover rate and the technology gap. As 
mentioned earlier, we emphasize the idea that when the gap is large, the benefits to free 
riding are greater than when the gap is small.  
Since the firms will be playing a differential game, some amendments to the 
features of the model in the previous section are made without resulting in a loss of 
generality and without changing the essence of the previous game. First, in the dynamic 
game, the firms will be choosing their R&D investments itI  (rate of change of R&D over 
time) rather than the R&D level itX . We do not restrict itI  to be positive. A negative itI  
is realized when an asset is sold or disposed. Thus, we have 
2,1, ==⋅ iIX itit                  (18) 
For simplicity it is assumed the depreciation rate of zero. Secondly, the cost of such 











1 β+=                 for firm 1        (19) 
                                                 










=    for firm 2      (20) 
We observe from (19) that if firm 1 decides to fully free-ride on the leader by choosing a 
very low tX 1 , then its cost of R&D would become very large (close to∞ ). Such a 
formulation is robust to the Amir’s critique. 
 The timing of the game is such that there are two stages in each period. Now, 
since in the second stage of each period the firms choose their output, which are ex-post 
functions of itX  and jtX only, the reduced forms of the firms’ first stage objective 
functions can be derived so that the only choice variables of the dynamic game are R&D 
investment levels. Thus, firms compete to find their optimal R&D time path. Moreover, 
we shall use the concept of open-loop Nash equilibrium23 to solve the differential game. 
It is also important to note that unlike the case described by Vencatachellum (1998), the 
open loop Nash equilibrium in our model does not coincide with the myopic strategy 
whereby the firm does not take into account the R&D of its rival while choosing its 
optimal path.24 We shall now use (16) and (17) to endogenize the spillover rate in the 









−≡β                 (21) 
                                                 
23 An open-loop Nash equilibrium is found when a competitor takes his rival’s reaction function solely as a 
function of time in his dynamic optimization problem. For more details see Dockner et al (2000). We 
assume an open-loop equilibrium as in Peretto (1996) since we are unable to find a closed-form solution to 
analyze the properties of the model for a closed-loop or Markov perfect equilibrium. In principle, if the 
objective function is of linear quadratic form, the closed-loop equilibrium can be found by setting the 
Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation. 
 
 
24  This special case arises since the Hamiltonian function of his model is linear and separable in its rival’s 
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Since the quantity and profit functions of the first stage are unchanged, we only find the 
open loop Nash equilibrium of the first stage. 
 
Definition 4.1.1 
The pair (θ1, θ2) is called an open-loop Nash equilibrium with function θj mapping t 
[ )T,0∈   to a real number if for each j = 1, 2 , an optimal control path Ij(.) of the problem 
below exists  and is given by Ij(t)= θj(t). 





































iTX   is the interest rate (23) 
Using (11), (18), (20) and (21), we can write firm 2’s dynamic problem as 































iTX     (24) 
The current value Hamiltonian function27 and first order conditions for firm 1 are given 
by 
                                                 





&& =+  
If investment is negative in some period ( 0<itI ), then the firm incurs a loss of DRitC & . 
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XeLim λρ                   (30) 




















































































++−= ρµµ    (33) 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 We assume that the exogenous variables A, b and C are chosen so that they belong to the subset of real 
numbers which would satisfy the Mangasarian second order sufficient conditions for the dynamic problems 

































XeLim µρ                   (36) 
The above equations enable us to derive the main result of this section. In 
particular we are now in a position to look at the dynamic equilibrium of the R&D two 
stage game in which the technology gap evolves over time. 
Proposition 4.1.1 
Assume that at the steady state tI1 = tI 2 =0. If the conditions given in the above open loop 
differential game hold, then  
(i) there exists a steady state subgame perfect Nash equilibrium given by 
=*1tX ACX t −=*2  for all C > A, 
(ii) the equilibrium is unique, 
(iii) there exists a stable path converging to it and 
(iv) the path is unique as it is the Saddle Path. 
(v) at the steady state equilibrium of the full game, 0→itq as ACX it −→  for 
i=1,2 and there exists a  neighborhood around the steady state in which  both 
itq  and  itX are falling 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 4.1.1 states that if the R&D of both firms were to stop growing at a 
so-called “steady state” then it must be the case that technology catch-up has taken place 
in the industry as long as the marginal costs are large enough. Therefore, when the basic 
29 
AJ model is augmented to allow for an endogenous spillover rate which depends on the 
dynamics of the technology gap between the two firms, ex-post symmetry occurs. Thus, 
the follower, benefiting from the externalities, builds up more absorptive capacity and the 
leader responds to this by reducing its own R&D. As a result, the technology gap shrinks 
over time.  
The intuition behind this proposition is best described in terms of two opposite 
driving forces affecting R&D incentives. The first one originates from the competitive 
pressure which the follower puts on the leader so that the latter has no other alternative 
than to increase its own R&D effort in order to maintain its market share advantage. The 
second effect arises when the leader reduces its R&D effort in anticipation that the 
follower might free ride excessively from its research activities. Our findings corroborate 
those of Grunfeld (2003) who shows that the relative strengths of the two effects are 
determined by the follower’s level of absorptive capacity. Thus when the size of the 
technology gap is small (high absorptive capacity), there are weaker incentives for R&D 
efforts. It is also noteworthy that the model predicts a unique and stable Nash equilibrium 
in contrast to the previous section.28 
We also find that when the R&D levels of both firms converge to their steady 
state values, the second period quantity produced converge to zero. We also show in the 
appendix that this can happen only if the investment levels of both firms are negative in 
the neighborhood of the steady state. Thus, this is a clear example of creative destruction 
                                                 












1 = is another possible 
steady state configuration in which all variables grow at a constant rate in equilibrium. Also note that the 
requirement that C > A would imply that it is possible that the optimal (product) output for one firm is zero 
in some periods. 
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or what is also referred to as the Schumpeterian effect at work. Intuitively, the laggard’s 
free-riding behavior causes the leader to invest too little. As a result, inadequate R&D 
levels fail to reduce the firms’ marginal cost of production by an amount which would 





















5. A General Model of Dynamic R&D with Endogenous Spillovers 
 The aim of this section is to provide a more general class of results for dynamic 
R&D games with uni-directional spillovers. In particular we ask which criteria (if any) 
are required to determine whether a Schumpeterian effect (as in Section 4) or a Non-
Schumpeterian effect will prevail in a dynamic two stage R&D game with endogenous 
spillovers.  
In what follows, we will develop a theory of dynamic optimal investment in an 
economy where the representative industry is a duopoly with one-way endogenous 
spillovers and in which firms play a two stage R&D game in each period. Among the few 
necessary amendments to the model of Section 4 are: An economy in which savers are 
the shareholders of the firms, a more general specification of the R&D cost function, a 
generic distance function to characterize the technology gap and some basic assumptions 
on the smoothness of the profit function. The requirement of a consumer-side economy is 
necessary not so much for the sake of completing the model in the general equilibrium 
sense but most importantly to allow for a platform (stock market) on which the firm’s 
R&D investment can be valued. 
5.1 The Model 
 We shall consider an economy as in Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) in 
which labor supply is perfectly elastic and each consumer consumes a constant 
proportion of their income in each period. This setting has two important properties. First, 
the discount rate is equal to the rate of interest, that is ρ 29 = tr and secondly, labor supply 
decisions are exogenously given. Since our main concern is to look at the dynamics of the 
                                                 
29 Abuse of notation: ρ has been used as the interest rate in the previous section. However, due to the 
above property they will be treated as equal henceforth. 
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duopolists’ R&D investments, such an extreme simplification of the consumer economy 
allows us to “transfer” all the dynamics from consumption to production. The production 
side of the economy consists of n identical duopolistic industries in which the firms play 
a two stage R&D game. Here one should note that owing to the assumption that the n 
industries are identical, the growth rate of the whole economy can be extrapolated from 
the growth rate of the representative industry. Now, since the only variables growing in 
any industry are the two rival firms’ R&D spending, it must be the case that the dynamic 
two stage R&D game fully characterizes the economy’s behavior. Thus, this “reduced 
form” of the dynamic general equilibrium model of the current section, is similar to the 
starting points of the R&D games discussed in Sections 3 and 4. 
 The duopolists will take the demand derived from the consumer problem as given 
and compete in Cournot fashion in the output market in the second stage of the game. We 
shall make the following assumptions: 
Assumption 5.2.1 
The first stage reduced form benefit function is given by   
( ) jiiXX tjiii ≠=≡ ,,2,1,,, βππ                                       (37) 
where ( ) ( )1,0,,, ∈≡ bbXX jiββ                 (38) 
Also ( )⋅iπ  is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and strictly concave in iX . 
Moreover it is decreasing in jX and ( )⋅iiXπ  is bounded from above. 
And ( ) ( )1,0∈⋅iβ  , ( ) 01 ≤⋅Xβ  , ( ) 02 ≥⋅Xβ . 
 We ought to impose a few more qualifications on (37) and (38). First, the demand 
schedule derived in the consumer problem and the marginal effective costs of production 
33 
(2) and (3) are chosen such that the conditions imposed on the profit function in 
assumption 5.2.1 are satisfied.30   
Secondly, given the dependence of (37) on ( )bXX ji ,,β , one can observe that it is 
possible that ( ) 0
21
≥⋅Xπ due to the free riding effect. It is, therefore, plausible that at first 
glance our assumption that ( ) 0
21
≤⋅Xπ may seem contradicting. However, if we recall that 
the first stage profit function of firm 1 (the follower) is positively related to the effective 
cost of firm 2 (leader), we would understand that increases in 2X  (apart from the free 
riding effect) also reduces the leader’s cost and hence the follower’s profit. Hence the 
correct interpretation of this negative cross partial derivative would be that the negative 
effect (due to the leader’s own cost reductions) of the leader’s incremental research on 
the follower’s profits exceeds the latter’s  benefits from free riding on the leader’s 
research. Another feature of assumption 5.2.1 is that ( )⋅β  can be regarded as a distance 
function that corresponds to the technology gap and it can be shown that in any normed 
real vector space there exists a general class of functions satisfying the 
property: ( ) 0,, =bXX jiβ  if and only if iX = jX . 
Assumption 5.2.2 
The R&D costs functions of firm 1 is given by   
( )( )bXXI
X








⎛+=      ,     (39)  
                                                 
30 It is not difficult to verify that there exist a class of functions for the demand schedule and marginal cost 
curve that will satisfy those conditions.  
34 












IC DRtI t  















IC DR ItI tt    and 0
&
1 11
≥DR XtX ttC             (40) 
              










⎛+= φ     ,         (41)  



























IC DR ItI tt  and    
0&2 22 ≥DR XtX ttC           (42) 
where iI  is the rate of change of iX over time
31  while ( )⋅'φ  and ( )⋅''φ  are the first and 
second derivatives of ( )⋅φ  with respect to iI . 
Assumption 5.2.2 simply implies a cost function that is monotonically increasing and 
convex in investment and is decreasing and convex in R&D stock. (39) and (41) also 
imply that the price of investment is equal to 1 for both firms. This completes the model. 
5.2 Solving the Model 
By using the principle of backward induction and bearing in mind that the second 
stage output level has already been chosen in terms of tiX  and jtX , we solve for the 
optimal itI  and jtI  in the first stage of the game by solving for the subgame perfect open 
loop Nash equilibrium. Firm 1 objective function is given by 
( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }dtIIeMax ttttI t ⋅⋅+−−⋅∫∞ − φβπρ 1110 11            
 s.t ititit XIX δ−=
⋅






iT  is the depreciation 
rate.           (43)  
                                                 
31 Time subscripts have been omitted in the above functions for convenience. 
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 Firm 2 objective function is given by 
( ) ( ){ }dtIIeMax ttttI t ⋅−−⋅∫∞ − φπρ 22202            
  s.t ititit XIX δ−=
⋅






iT        (44) 
The Hamiltonian function and its first order conditions for firm 1 can be given as 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )itit
i
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dH                 (46) 














111 1 βφφβπλδρλ            (47) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )⋅⋅−⋅−+=⋅
22 1122 tt XXtt
I βφπλδρλ                                      (48) 





XeLim λρ                         (50) 
The Hamiltonian function and its first order conditions for firm 2 can be given as 
( ) ( ) ( )itit
i
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dH                             (52) 
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( ) ( )( )⋅−+=⋅
tXtt 1211
πµδρµ                                             (54) 
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XeLim µρ                         (56) 
Given the above first order conditions32 we can now derive the main propositions 
of this paper. We start by deriving an important lemma which constitutes the basis for our 
propositions. 
Lemma 5.3.1 
If assumptions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 hold, then t1λ and t2µ are the net marginal values of the 
follower’s and the leader’s R&D respectively. 
Proof: 
For the follower (firm 1), rewriting (47), yields 















111 1 βφφβπλδρλ       (57) 
Multiplying both sides by ( )te δρ+− and taking the integral with respect to time from zero to 
infinity on both sides and rewriting we have 





















1 βφφβπλ δρδρ     (58) 
From the First Fundamental Theorem of Calculus we have, 




















1 βφφβπλ δρδρ           (59) 
Using the transversality condition (50) we have 
                                                 
32 Note that though ( )⋅φ  has been used interchangeably in both firms’ problems, they are not equal in 






























1 βφφβπλ δρ    (60) 
Thus at any time t we have  

















11 1 βφφβπλ δρ     (61) 
Now from (61), we observe that the bracketed expression consists of three terms. The 
first one is the marginal increase in profits due to an incremental unit of R&D ( tX 1 ). The 




β ) gives us the 
marginal reduction in the cost of investment due to the incremental unit of R&D ( tX 1 ). 
Thus the RHS of (61) should give us the marginal value of the follower’s R&D ( tX 1 ) at 
any time t discounted by the time preference parameter and the depreciation rate. Hence 
it gives us the net marginal value of the follower’s R&D at any point in time. By 
analogous arguments one can find the net marginal value of the leader’s R&D at any 
point in time and it will be given by the following expression; 
















φπµ δρ                         (62)          
▪ 
Lemma 5.3.1 gives an important result about the shadow price of the two firms’ R&D 
levels. Savers in this economy would use t1λ and  t2µ  as indicators33 for the value of their 
investments in the stock market. 
 
                                                 
33 Although in practice the shadow price of capital, which is also referred to as Tobin’s q in the investment 




If assumptions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 hold, then t1λ = t2µ in equilibrium, that is the marginal 
values of the two firms’ R&D should be equal. 
Proof: 
From Lemma 5.3.1 we know that 01 >tλ and 02 >tµ are the marginal values of the 
follower’s and the leader’s respectively. We claim that t1λ = t2µ in equilibrium. Suppose 
not, then we have two possible cases (i) t1λ > t2µ or (ii) t1λ < t2µ . Case (i) implies that the 
valuation of firm 1 at time t is greater than that of firm 2. A frictionless stock market 
would imply that savers would transfer theirs funds from the firm with lower valuation to 
the firm with the higher valuation such that the marginal value of the latter will start to 
fall (recall that from assumption 5.2.1 that the firm’s benefits from R&D increase at a 
decreasing rate and from assumption 5.2.2, the  reductions in the cost of investment due 
to an additional unit of R&D also decrease at a decreasing rate) while that of the firm 
with the lower valuation will start to rise. Thus the no-arbitrage condition would imply 
that case (i) cannot be equilibrium. By analogous arguments one can show that case (ii) 
cannot hold. ▪34 
Proposition 5.3.1 states that if investors (identical savers of this economy) were to 
allocate their funds in the representative industry comprising of the leader and the 
follower firms, then the valuations (in terms of the marginal benefits of shareholders) of 
these two firms on the stock market must equalize in equilibrium. The economic intuition 
behind this result is given as follows. In a dynamic economy in which agents invest in the 
two firms of the representative industry, the shadow price of such investments can be 
                                                 
34 At t1λ = t2µ , the consumer is indifferent between investing in firm 1 and investing in firm 2.  
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observed in terms of the valuation of these firms on the stock market. Now since 
shareholders are always seeking higher returns they would increase (decrease) their 
investment in the firm with higher (lower) valuation. But as this process goes on the 
marginal values of the firms would fall (rise) until they become equal in equilibrium. 
Proposition 5.3.1 also clearly justifies the importance of having a consumer side in our 
model.  Thus although the R&D activities of the two firms are not a priori comparable, 
when their respective valuations are translated to the investor’s portfolio, we can find a 
relationship between their marginal values. 
Proposition 5.3.2 
If assumptions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 hold, then the two firms’ R&D investment strategies are 
strategic complements; that is, an increase in the leader’s investment rate will lead to an 
increase in the follower’s investment rate and vice versa. 
Proof: 
Lemma 5.3.1 gives us two expressions for t1λ and t2µ respectively. Equating them as per 
Proposition 5.3.1, and using (46) and (52), we have 

























































2 'φφ    (63) 
Now treating tX 1 , tX 2 and b as exogenous and by taking total derivatives on both sides of 
(63), we can make use of the convexity assumption (in 5.2.2) to establish a positive 
relationship between tI1 , tI 2 .▪ 
Proposition 5.3.2 gives us a very important result in the theory of two stage 
dynamic R&D games with one-way endogenous spillovers. It states that an increase in 
the leader’s R&D will initially encourage the follower to increase its R&D. Subsequently, 
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the leader will respond to the latter increase to by raising its own R&D level even higher. 
In this way the technological frontier is always shifting outwards. Intuitively, proposition 
5.3.2 can be better described along these lines. If both firms in the duopoly face rising 
marginal costs of R&D, then an incremental increase in the level of R&D by one firm 
will increase its marginal cost as well. Now, since in equilibrium the marginal costs of 
the firms must be equal, the best response of the rival firm must be to increase its level of 
R&D. The rationale for the result is that when the follower undertakes some research, the 
leader’s technological advantage starts to fall and in order to maintain its lead it has to 
invest further. Thus the laggard always pushes the leader to do more research and as a 
result a competitive market structure prevails at all times. 
Proposition 5.3.3 
If assumptions 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 hold, then 
(i) in the absence of spillovers both technology catch-up and symmetric 
investment are sufficient conditions for the existence of a steady state in the 
dynamic two stage R&D game ( Schumpeterian economy) 
(ii) in the presence of spillovers, only technology catch-up is a sufficient condition 
for the existence of a steady state in the dynamic two stage R&D game (Non-
Schumpeterian economy)  
 Proof: 
Define the steady state as the balanced growth path on which 0=tg Q  where tg Q  is the 
growth rate of total output in the representative industry. The latter fully characterizes the 
behavior of the whole economy. Now, since we know that the only two variables growing 
in the industry are the two firms R&D stock, we assume that 0=tg Q  is equivalent 
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1 =  (Note that the steady 
state =tI1 =tI 2 0 of the previous section can be seen as a special case of this.) 
(i) Technology catch-up (sufficiency) 
Consider equation (63) for the case where 0=β , that is there are no spillovers. 
























































2 'φφ        (64) 
Now suppose catch up takes place at some time t, then =tX 1 tX 2 . (64) becomes 
























































2 'φφ        (65) 
























'φφ  is monotonically 
increasing in itI , it must be the case that =tI1 tI 2 (symmetric investment). Thus, 












1 = and hence technology catch-up implies the 
existence of a steady state. 
Symmetric Investment (sufficiency) 
                                                 
35 In general, if total output tQ can be expressed as a function of the technology gap only ,  then  for the 
class of distance functions assumed in our framework, tgtg XX 21 =  if and only if that 0=tg Q . An 
example of a differential game in which tgtg XX 21 =  at the steady state can be found in Traca and Reis 
(2003).  The latter prove that tgtg XX 21 = should hold at the steady state for a Cobb-Douglas distance 
function. We also note that the spillover distance function used in the previous section also satisfies this 
property.  More specifically, it can be shown that 0=tg Q  if  the growth rate of the spillover distance 















11 +=+ or tgtg XX 21 =  for 
large tbX 1 and tbX 21 . 
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1 'φφ        (66) 






















I 111 'φφ  is monotonically 
decreasing in itX , it must be the case that =tX 1 tX 2 . But =tX 1 tX 2  implies catch-up if 
the technology gap belongs to the special class of functions satisfying ( )tt XXT 21 ,  = 0 if 












1 =  since =tI1 tI 2 . ▪ 
(ii) Technology catch-up (sufficiency) 
Consider equation (63) again 

























































2 'φφ     
Now suppose catch up takes place at some time t, then =tX 1 tX 2 .Given the condition 

























































2 'φφ      (67) 
























'φφ  is monotonically 












1 = .  This completes 
the proof. ▪36 
                                                 
36 We leave it as an exercise to the reader to disprove that symmetric investment is a sufficient condition for 
the existence of a steady state in the presence of spillovers. 
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 Proposition 5.2.3 gives us an important relationship between the existence of a 
steady state and the level of technology gap between firms. Before any further description 
of this result one important general observation between the technology gap and R&D 
incentives ought to be made. If the technology gap becomes zero at some point in time, 
then around its neighborhood the leader’s R&D level has to be increasing (decreasing) at 
a lower (higher) rate than that of the follower since 1020 XX > were assumed to be the 
initial conditions. Moreover, if symmetric investment always implies technology catch-
up, then it must be the case that at some point in time before the catch-up state the 
leader’s investment level rose (fell) at a lower (higher) rate than that of the follower. 
Intuitively, the follower’s incremental investment reduces the leader incentives to 
undertake high levels of research due to the free riding effect. Hence, this is an example 
of a Schumpeterian effect due to the possibility of creative destruction. As a corollary to 
this observation, we have the fact that in a state in which symmetric investment does not 
imply that the gap shrinks to zero, it is possible that the follower’s incremental increase in 
R&D effort leads to an even larger incremental increase in the leader’s effort (excluding 
of course the case where =tI1 =tI 2 0 ). Thus in this scenario the leader would always 
innovate further to maintain its technological lead. This is an example of a Non-
Schumpeterian effect whereby the leader always innovates further for fear of losing its 
technological advantage. 
 Proposition 5.2.3 states that if there is no technological leakage between the 
leader and the follower in the dynamic two stage R&D game, then convergence (catch-up 
or ex-post symmetry) both in R&D stock and at the R&D investment level are sufficient 
conditions for the existence of a steady state. However, if we introduce endogenous 
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externalities into the model, then it is possible to have symmetric investment with R&D 
stock asymmetry in which the leader remains the leader and thrives to maintain its lead. 
While this result primarily helps demarcate between the Schumpeterian and the Non-
Schumpeterian effects in a general class of dynamic R&D games, it also leads to an 
interesting policy implication; with less appropriation (less strict rules against the act of 
reverse engineering or  fewer rules hindering the diffusion of technology) we can always 
have an economy that enjoys Non-Schumpeterian growth in the sense that competition 
always takes place in a competitive rather than in a monopolistic environment. This 
emerges directly from poposition 5.2.3 which postulates that the presence of spillovers 
can lead to a Non-Schumpeterian economy. Our results, together with the empirical 
findings of Cohen and Levinthal (1989) provide a strong case in favor of lower 
appropriations.  
While the result shows that technological diffusion in form of imitation/ reverse 
engineering may not always be a bad thing, its significance varies from industry to 
industry. For example in manufacturing industries, the innovator is “protected” in two 
ways. First, the lead-time is long enough to serve the same function as a short-term 
intellectual property of rights and secondly, complete imitation may be so costly that the 
follower absorbs only a fraction of the leader’s new technology. 
However, in semiconductor industries, chips are vulnerable to rapid and cheap copying 
which worsens the ability of innovative chip developers such as Intel to recover the high 
R&D costs. Thus, in the latter case, our results that increasing competition due to 
imitation may lead to higher industry growth can be used as an argument for reverse 
engineering.  
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 One possible extension of the above framework is endogenize the spillovers by 
using the technology gap function and also by making the spillover rate a control variable 
which the level can choose. While in a static setting, the noncooperative level of spillover 




















                                                 
37 See  Kamien and Zang (2000) 
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6. Summary and Concluding Remarks 
 We have proposed a representation of an asymmetric two stage R&D game in 
which technology diffuses from the leader to the follower if and only if the latter 
undertakes some minimum R&D of its own. Moreover, while such externalities increase 
the benefits of producing goods, it also increases the cost of doing research. This paper 
has extended the basic AJ framework by including uni-directional endogenous spillovers 
and allowing such externalities to depend on the size of the technology gap. In addition, it 
accommodates these additional features by posting a dynamic two stage game in which 
the dynamics of the gap can be captured. These two features (endogenous spillovers and 
R&D costs increasing in the spillover rate) allow us to derive some important 
relationships between the technology gap and research incentives, as well as the dynamic 
equilibrium of a differential game. 
 Our analysis of a static game reveals primarily (in an extended AJ framework) 
that there exists a non-monotonic relationship between free-riding behavior and the 
spillover rate. However, the SPNE of the game was not unique. From this observation 
and the fact that technology gap evolves over time, we formulate an R&D differential 
game with one-way endogenous spillovers. We found that the technology gap would 
shrink to zero if there were to exist steady state equilibrium in our dynamic example. 
Furthermore, the equilibrium would be stable if the industry costs were large enough. 
 In a more general setting, we found, under some reasonable assumptions, that 
catch-up and symmetric investment are sufficient conditions for the existence of a steady 
state in a framework with no spillovers and that steady states with no catch-up exist only 
in the presence of spillovers. Thus, we infer that the latter can promote welfare (growth) 
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by enhancing dynamic competition in an economy. Promising directions for further 
investigation include the extension of our analysis to a cooperative setting with research 
joint ventures (as has been done traditionally for the static and exogenous spillover case). 
Also, proper characterization of the stability conditions that would guarantee a Saddle 





















7.1Derivations of (13) and (14) 
For firm 1, FOC of (11) (by substitutingβ  by (10) when appropriate) 





























−++−+      (A1) 
Simplifying (A1) gives (13). 



























   (A2) 
Simplifying (A2) gives (14). 
7.2 Proof for Proposition 3.1.1 
We shall derive this result from the reaction function of the laggard given by (15). By 
making 1X  the subject of formula, we find the roots of the graph, that is, we find the 
values of 2X  when 01 =X  




























=                   (A3) 
where CAf −= . 
Now, it can be shown that for 0<f  and 
9
2<b  , there will be one positive root and one 
negative root which lies to the right of the vertical asymptote. The vertical intercept is 












1                                           (A4) 
 Moreover the part of the graph that is relevant for the parameter space 0<f , 
9
2<b   and 
0. >iX  is an inverted u-shaped parabola which attains a maximum in the positive 
orthant. This implies that the laggard’s investment will increase up to the maximum point 











=                        (A5) 
We now try to determine the sign of MX 2  w.r.t b . 
Using (A4), we find that the sign is negative if 
9




1 << b . Thus, 
since MX 2∆−  is a proxy to free-riding, we conclude that free-riding increases with b  as 
long as 
9




1 << b . Hence, the relationship between 
MX 2∆− ( free-riding) is non-monotonic and is an inverted U-shaped. ▪ 
 
7.3 Proof for Proposition 3.1.2 
(A2) divided by (A1) gives 
( )( )( ) ( )


















  (A6) 
(A5) can be simplified as  
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   (A7) 
Now it can be shown that (A7) is the graph of a non-degenerate conic. Thus, it can either 
a hyperbola or ellipse with some rotation and/or translation from the origin. To prove for 
existence of a Nash equilibrium we find the 1X  and 2X  intercepts of this conic (which is 
a reduced-form of the reaction function of the leader firm) and compare their values with 
the 1X  and 2X  intercepts of the parabola (the reaction function of the laggard firm), the 


























=    (A8) 























=                        (A9) 
Now it can be shown that if b is low enough and C  is large enough, the 1X  intercept of 
the conic is always greater than that of the parabola. Moreover, if C  is large enough, b is 
low enough so that terms in 2b  can be ignored, the 2X  intercept of the conic is always 
less than that of the parabola. If we denote the difference between the parabola and the 
conic by some function ( )21 XXΨ , then as is well-known from the Weierstrass 
Intermediate Value Theorem that if a continuous function on an interval is sometimes 
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positive and sometimes negative, it must be zero at some point. This proves for existence 
of Nash equilibrium. However, we cannot guarantee uniqueness since both the parabola 
and the conic are non-monotonic functions. This completes the proof. ▪ 
7.4 Proof for Proposition 4.1.1 
Assume that at the steady state tI1 = tI 2 =0, then replacing tI1 = 0 in (26), we have  
t1λ = 0           (A10) 
Replacing (A10) in (27) and using the fact that (A10) implies 
.





















XXbXCA                                   (A11) 
Replacing tI 2 = 0 in (32), we have  
t1µ = 0          (A12) 
Replacing (A12) in (33) and using the fact that (A12) implies 
.



















XXbCA             (A13) 




−−=              (A14) 
Now since ( )1,0∈b  and ,*1tX 0*2 ≥tX  we choose our parameter values such that C >A.38 
                                                 
38 Note that this “high cost industries” assumption might imply that the second stage output for this 
example is negative in some periods. 
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The above proves part (i) and (ii) of Proposition 4.1.1. To check the stability we have to 
linearize the system of differential equations given by (26), (27), (32) and (33) in the 
neighborhood of the steady state. After some manipulations of these four equations we 



















































































































































































                 
                                                                       (A16) 
We first compute the Jacobian determinant of the above evaluated at the steady state 
value ACXX tt −== *2*1 . Note that the calculation is made simpler since we know that 









1 ,, tttt IandIII  are equal to zero. Bearing this fact in mind 
and after taking the total derivatives of the above expressions with respect 
with tt andXX 21 we arrive (after some algebraic manipulations) to the following Jacobian 
matrix: 
( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )( )
( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )




































J          (A17) 
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CAbJ                   (A18) 
Since 0≤J holds by definition for the parameter restrictions39 of our model, we 
conclude that the steady state equilibrium is stable. Hence there exists a stable path 
converging to the unique steady state of our model. However, it is possible that there is 
more than one path converging to such steady state. We next prove that this path is 
unique; that is it is a Saddle Path. 
In control theory it is well known that if the set of eigenvalues given by the matrix in 
(A17) contains a positive real part and a negative real part, then the path to the steady 
state of the system described above is a Saddle path. It can be verified40 that (A17) has 
two eigenvalues and given the parameter restrictions of our model, the fact that one is 
positive and the other is negative holds by definition.  
For part (v), we consider four different cases. (1) The investment levels of both firms are 
negative in the neighborhood of the steady state. (2) The investment level of firm 1 is 
negative while that of firm 2 is positive. (3) The investment level of firm 1 is positive 
while that of firm 2 is negative. (4) The investment levels of both firms are positive. For 
case (1), we let the R&D level of firm 1 and firm 2 be 







+−=  evaluated at 1ε+− AC and 2ε+− AC  for i=1,2. We find 
that 0>itq for i=1,2 as long as 21 εε −  is not too large. By analogous reasoning, we find 
                                                 
39 Note we use once more the “high cost” condition that C > A. 
40 The derivations can be provided upon request. 
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that for each of the cases (2) – (4), at least one firm does not have an incentive to produce 
a positive output. Thus 0>itq for i=1,2 only for case (1). Hence, we have a positive mass 
in the neighborhood of the steady state equilibrium of the full game only if the R&D 
stocks of both firms are falling in its neighborhood. This completes the proof. ▪ 
 
 
FIGURE 1      
(b=1/10) Note : X= Leader’s R&D , Y= Follower’s R&D 
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FIGURE 2       
(b=1/50) 
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FIGURE 3      
(b=1/100)


































































III. Process Spillovers and Growth.                                              
                                                           
                                            Abstract 
 
This paper develops a non-Schumpeterian endogenous growth model of R&D in 
which the firm’s free-riding behavior, reinforced by a lack of appropriability in its 
industry, constitutes a major source of growth in the economy. While models analyzing 
the interaction between either imitation and innovation or spillovers and innovation have 
already appeared in the literature, we show how imitation via free-riding behavior and 
spillovers can mutually promote dynamic competition and hence economic growth. The 
representative industry, which is of duopolistic market structure, comprises a leader who 
innovates and a laggard who free-rides by exploiting the source of intra-industry 
spillover. We find firstly that the innovation strategies of the two firms can be 
dynamically strategic complements if a large technology gap prevails and, secondly, that 
there is a case for process reverse engineering as a fall in the level of appropriability 
results in higher growth. 
 
Keywords: process imitation, innovation, spillovers, technology gap, endogenous growth 












One of the prominent features of R&D based endogenous growth models is that the 
existence of spillovers due to the lack of appropriability and the resulting competition are 
always detrimental to an economy’s  growth performance. However, it is difficult to 
reconcile this prediction with real life facts. According to Kamien and Schwartz (1982), 
empirical studies on the relationship between market structure and the rate of diffusion of 
innovations indicate that innovation is positively related to the competitiveness of the 
industry into which it is introduced. Also, Cohen and Levithal (1989) found that the 
effect of appropriability on innovative activity is negative and significant, and hence 
concluded that contrary to traditional results intra-industry spillovers may encourage 
R&D investments in equilibrium.41 Clearly, imitation or free-riding behavior driven by 
the presence of R&D spillovers is a potential source of competitive pressure that deters 
industry leaders from behaving as monopolists and prompts them to innovate further. 
This paper presents a theoretical inspection of the effects of process spillovers on 
competition in a R&D based endogenous growth model. Our main concern is to 
characterize the dynamic interaction between innovation and imitation (via free-riding 
behavior) when spillovers generated by the former activity makes the latter easier. This 
interaction introduces an element of strategic complementarity between innovative and 
imitative strategies at the steady state equilibrium. The analytical framework is based on 
a two-stage noncooperative differential game between two firms; a leader and a follower 
                                                 
41 They argue that yet another important role of R&D is to enhance the firm’s ability to assimilate and 
exploit existing information. In this paper free-riding via reverse engineering is made possible by spillovers 
which facilitate the follower’s absorption and learning of the leader’s technology. 
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in a representative industry.42 In this setting, we examine the long-term behavior of each 
firm given the dynamics of their technology gap.  In contrast to previous studies, we 
show that, owing to the presence of spillovers from innovation, the dynamic best 
response of the leader facing imitation43 is to innovate further rather than to dwell on its 
short-run higher profits. Since the aggregate rate of innovation is given by the sum of the 
firms’ specific innovation or imitation, the economy’s growth steady state rate depends 
on the growth rate of innovation which, in turn, depends on the growth rate of imitation. 
In the transitional dynamics, the same findings are observed for large technology gaps. 
Moreover, it is possible that an increase in appropriability reduces innovation and hence 
growth. 
 One important assumption of the model is the duopolistic structure of the 
representative industry. We therefore define the market configuration of the industry in 
terms of the relative technology gap.44 While Traca and Reis (2003) compare the market 
configuration stability between the symmetric and asymmetric cases, we show that along 
the transitional dynamics the technology gap growth path is stable and we therefore infer 
that the underlying market configuration in our model is stable.45  
One noteworthy implication of this paper is that it helps to provide some 
economic basis for the phenomenon of reverse engineering. The model demonstrates that 
at least for the case of process reverse engineering, less appropriability is better as it 
promotes growth. Handa (1995) in a study of legal implications of reverse engineering 
                                                 
42 Unlike Traca and Reis (2003), in which there is no a priori difference between the leader and the laggard 
apart from the initial technology gap, we emphasize the fact that the leader only innovates, while the 
follower, benefiting from a relatively larger spillover free-rides on the leader. 
43 We do not distinguish between imitation and free-riding behavior in this paper. 
44 This implies that a larger gap means that the leader controls a larger market share and hence the market 
configuration is asymmetric. The symmetric case is when competition is neck and neck. 
45 One possible line of defense in favor of the duopolistic structure is that the barriers to entry or fixed costs 
ensure that only two firms can thrive in the market at any point in time. 
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concluded that the Canadian Copyright Act is juridicially underdeveloped and too 
uncertain to provide solutions. In yet another contribution on legal implications of reverse 
engineering, Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) argued that restrictions on reverse 
engineering ought to be imposed only if they are justified in terms of the specific 
characteristics of the industry and their economic effects. We see the process of reverse 
engineering as a key determinant of innovation in the long-run. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief 
overview of the literature. In section 3 we present a dynamic general equilibrium model 
featuring innovation, imitation and spillovers. In section 4, we present our results and 















2. Related Work 
The main point of departure of our model from the traditional R&D based 
endogenous growth framework is that it is competitive rather than monopolistic behavior 
at the R&D level which generates growth. The prevailing paradigm is based on 
Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction and models within such frameworks are often 
referred to as Schumpeterian models. Aghion and Howitt (1992) show, in a model of 
vertical innovations, that the prospect for more future research discourages current 
research by threatening to destroy the rents created by such research . Similar views are 
shared by Grossman and Helpman (1991a; 1991b) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).  
Some of these studies highlight the role of ongoing product upgrading and 
product cycles46 in characterizing the steady state equilibrium. In particular, the firm 
holding the state-of-the-art, that is the one with the lowest price adjusted quality, acts as a 
monopolist in the representative industry.47 The firms in the latter play a Bertrand game 
competing on price adjusted quality and such a structure by design leads to a 
monopolistic market configuration at any point in time.48 Another consequence of the 
homogenous Bertrand game assumption is that imitation can be carried out only by 
relatively lower-cost firms, while successful innovations lead to instantaneous 
leapfrogging. They show that in general three equilibria exist: the monopolist is a low-
cost imitator, the monopolist is a leader who has regained its lead from a low-cost 
imitator and the monopolist is an innovator who has leapfrogged the leader. Connolly 
(1997, 1999, 2001) building on the above models, introduces the idea of reverse 
                                                 
46 This is due to Vernon (1966). 
47 The idea of quality ladder is also pioneered by these authors and a higher step of the ladder is reached 
only if another firm leapfrogs the current leader. 
48 Though in Segerstom’s (1991) model there can be two firms producing the state-of-the-art, the market 
structure is still monopolistic since those firms would form a coalition. 
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engineering and learning-to-learn as sources of technological diffusion in North-South 
trade. Despite her emphasis on the importance of imitation in the transitional dynamics, 
the concept of creative destruction is still inherent to her analysis. 
 More recently the question of whether easier imitation of technological leaders is 
necessarily bad for growth has been given increasing attention. Aghion et al (1997, 2001) 
have shown that when imitation occurs, leaders tend to innovate further to escape 
competition or to reestablish their lead. Such models following their spirit have been 
referred to as non-Schumpeterian models. One of the motivations of this framework is 
that when the doctrine of creative destruction in R&D based endogenous growth models 
is applied to real life, it leads to counterfactual predictions. It is therefore possible that 
there exists some missing link which can explain the empirical failure of Schumpeterian 
models. In this paper, we show that dynamic interactions between firms in an economy 
represent a potential candidate for that missing element. 
  Meanwhile, other studies working in the non-Schumpeterian paradigm, have 
looked into the relationship between product market competition and growth. Aghion et 
al (1997, 2001), using a model in which R&D incentives occur only in three possible 
states, found that innovative incentives are higher in the neck and neck state. However, 
their models do not incorporate the externalities generated by innovative activities. Our 
paper is closest to Traca and Reis (2003) who, in a model of duopolistic competition 
within the endogenous growth paradigm, show that spillovers raise the rate of innovation 
as they spur a source of competitive pressure on the leader. Although our approach is 
similar to theirs, our model differs from theirs in non-trivial ways. First, spillovers in our 
model are heterogeneous as the follower who reverse engineers the leader’s innovation 
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benefits from larger externalities than the leader. Such heterogeneity is not addressed in 
their paper. Secondly, we show that the results remain robust in the transitional dynamics 
as long as the technology gap is large enough and that the policy maker can control for 


















                                                 
49 Another non-Schumpeterian model with no spillovers is developed by Mukoyama (2003) who shows 
that subsidizing imitation might increase the economy-wide rate of technological progress and that 
competition and growth might be positively correlated. 
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3. The Model 
3.1 Overview 
 We consider a model with n goods, n industries with 2 firms each, and infinitely 
lived identical consumers. The latter face two optimization problems: temporal and 
intertemporal utility maximization. Preferences across goods and time are logarithmic. In 
the intertemporal problem the consumer chooses the optimal labor supply and 
consumption (or expenditure) for each period. The remaining income is invested in the 
industries’ R&D. To simplify the model we make the following assumptions.50 Firstly, 
we normalize expenditures to allow the rate of return to capital (savings of agents) to be 
constant and equal to the exogenously given discount rate. Moreover, we also assume 
that the risk of any firm is idiosyncratic and that the stock market values the firm so that 
its expected rate of return equals the risk free interest rate.51 Secondly, we assume that 
labor supply is perfectly elastic.52With the optimal amount to be spent in each period 
chosen, the representative agent can thus derive his demand function for each industry 
from his temporal optimization problem. 
 On the production side, the industry demand is derived from the consumer 
problem and taking such schedule as given, the duopolists in the representative industry 
compete in Cournot fashion to choose their respective output and research intensities 
(which are innovation rate for the leader and imitation rate for the laggard). If the 
productivity of one firm is higher than its competitor, then the former is the leader and 
the latter is the follower. A further qualification to the structure of our representative 
industry is the existence of heterogeneous intra-industry spillovers. Being an innovator, 
                                                 
50 These do not lead to loss of generality in our propositions. 
51 This is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
52 This follows from Aghion et al (2001). 
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the leader does not benefit much in terms of externality from the follower53 , while the 
follower which practises process reverse engineering benefits more than the leader. 
 The choices of the firm’s variables which are quantity and research intensities are 
done sequentially. We therefore use backward induction in a two-stage noncooperative 
game setting to formulate the firms’ optimum behavior. In the second stage the firms play 
a Cournot game to determine their respective quantities. Thus their respective profits as 
functions of their productivity54 levels can thus be derived. In the first stage, the leader 
(follower) plays a differential game to choose their optimal innovation (imitation) time 
path taking the technology gap (ratio of their productivity levels) dynamics as their state 
variable. The open-loop Nash equilibrium is then found .55 Since innovation and imitation 
are the only variables growing in the economy, the steady state growth rate is determined 
by the growth rates of those variables. Dynamic reaction functions are used to derive 
results. Effects of changes in appropriability and growth are analyzed. Finally the path of 
the technology gap is derived and some stability conditions are imposed. 
 
3.2 Formal Model 
Consumers  
Let  n , Ct , Lt , Qit , Rt and Wt be the number of industries, the consumption of the 
representative agent, his labor supply,quantity produced in the industry i for i =      
                                                 
53 We assume that the value of  the positive externality accruing to the leader is small but non-zero since 
there might be some heavily located facilities which are inherent to the setting up of a firm and that there 
might be some interactions among workers. 
54 Productivity is defined in terms of the per unit cost as in Traca and Reis (2003). 
55 An open-loop Nash equilibrium is found when a competitor takes his rival’s reaction function solely as a 
function of time in his dynamic optimization problem. Essentially, there is only one decision node. 
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1,2...,n, the interest rate and the wage rate respectively at time t. Then the intertemporal 
preference of the agent can be written as  
( ) 0,)(
0
>−≡ ∫∞ − ρρ dtLCueU ttt    where ρ is the discount rate   (1) 
)ln()( tt CCu ≡          (2) 
The intertemporal utility maximization problem results in (i) Wt = 1 and (ii) Rt = ρ after 








itt QCu  for all t          (3) 
The static utility maximization problem results in the industry demand curve57 
it
it P
MQ =         where M = 1/n           (4) 
Producers 
                                                 
56 Let consumer’s wealth at time t be At , Pt be the price of consumption and Pt Ct =1 due to normalization, 
then we have 
H= ln(Ct) - Lt + λt(  Rt At + Wt Lt - Pt Ct ) 
dH/ dCt  = 0 implies 1/ Pt Ct = λt , but since Pt Ct =1, λt =1  
dH/ dLt  = 0 implies Wt λt = 1 and hence Wt = 1 
Also d λt / dt = ρ λ - λRt , but since λt =1, d λt / dt = 0 or ρ  - Rt= 0 and therefore Rt = ρ 

























The logarithmic assumption leads to the following demand curve 
it
it nP
Q 1=  
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 Given the industry demand (4) each firm will choose its respective optimal 









We assume that firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. Each firm’s production 
function is given by 
qj= Aj Lj    for j =1,2                 (5) 
It can easily be inferred from (5) that the per unit cost of each firm is given by W*/ Aj 
where W* is the economy level wage rate. Also, due to our assumption Wt = 1, the per 
unit cost becomes  
  cj  = 1/ Aj              (6) 





. Λ=     where h is the R&D productivity    (7) 
 
jtΛ  is the spillover to firm j and DRL &  is the labor employed in the R&D sector. It is 
understood from our formulation that each firm operates in two sectors in which it 
employs labor. Our underlying assumption here is that workers are homogeneous since a 
constant wage rate ensures that no skill differentials among the workers are observable in 
the labor market. The term h is the R&D productivity level, which is assumed to be given 
in the industry. We are therefore left to qualify the spillovers jtΛ  which are the 
underpinnings of our analysis. 
                                                 
58 In this subsection of the paper, we sometimes omit subscript i for simplicity. 
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 Our definition of spillovers is similar to Cohen and Levinthal (1989) together with 
some extensions. In particular we define spillovers to include valuable knowledge 
generated in the research process of the leader and which becomes accessible to the 
follower if and only if the latter is reverse engineering the innovator’s research process. It 
is important here to note that had the follower not been imitating the leader, the spillover 
it enjoys would reduce to a small positive number equal to that of the leader (see footnote 
13). This also implies that the homogeneous assumption of Traca and Reis (2003) will be 
a special case of our model. Given this assumption of relatively larger spillovers favoring 
imitation vis-à-vis innovation, it becomes a better strategy for the follower to imitate by 
feeding off the leader’s innovation at least initially. Thus the follower is necessarily an 
imitator. 
 It is also implicit from our assumption that it is process imitation rather than 
product imitation which takes place in our framework. This also means that the 
conventional definition of reverse engineering as the decompilation of a finished product 
in order to gain a better understanding of how it was produced as in Handa (1995) does 
not fit well into our model. Rather we see reverse engineering as the act of extracting 
know-how or information from the industry leader  through channels like the labor 
market (turnover in R&D personnel, for example) in order to imitate the latter’s process 
(or cost-cutting) innovations.59 Hence, unlike Schumpeterian models, spillovers are not 
regarded as a pure public good since some effort (imitation) is involved in acquiring it. 








                                                 








−=Λ            (8) 
where σ1 , σ2  are less than ½  and σ2 > σ1. We let σ2 be inversely related to the 
appropriability level of the industry and we see that this expression will also increase the 
spillovers enjoyed by the follower. One can also think of it as a tool for the policy maker 
to regulate or protect patents. The second restriction ensures that imitators enjoy larger 







1=    > 1           (9) 
where the inequality shows that firm 1 is the leader. Also, the gap dynamics is given by 
 







≡α         for j =1,2          
α1  and α2  are the growth rates of innovation and imitation respectively. This completes 
the model. 
3.3 Solving the Model 
We solve the model by backward induction. 
Stage 2 
Using the inverse demand function (4), firm j’s profit maximization problem becomes  
jq
Max  Mqj/(qj +qi )  - cj qj   ,  j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j      (11) 
The Cournot Nash quantity for firm j is given by 
qj= (Mci)/(cj + ci)2,   j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j                 (12) 
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The profit function for firm j is given by 
Пj= (Mci2)/(cj + ci)2,   j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j                (13) 
Proof: See Appendix 
So far we have not provided a rationale for why we depart from the prevailing literature 
which uses a Bertrand differentiated product competition rather than a Cournot 
competition. We offer two justifications as to why this assumption suits our purpose 
better here. First, the homogeneous Cournot assumption by design implies that the only 
way for the leader (follower) to increase his market share is to increase (decrease) the 
cost differential which is given by the technology gap as shown in the next set of 
equations. Therefore the possibility of product innovation is ruled out in this setting and 
hence our model necessarily implies that all the imitation and innovation occur at the 
process level. Both Aghion et al. (2001) and Traca and Reis (2003) consider only process 
imitation in the former case and process spillovers in the latter case but yet they use a 
formulation (Bertand differentiated) in which both product and process innovations are 
possible. Secondly, our assumption allows the two firms to compete in both the product 
market and the R&D sector even for the case of product homogeneity unlike the Bertrand 
homogeneous game. This enables us to compare our model directly with the 
Schumpeterian paradigm (at least at the micro level) without changing the assumption of 
product homogeneity.  
 For the sake of simplifying the remainder of the analysis we rewrite the profit 
functions of (13) and research costs as functions of the technology gap only Gt .We thus 
have 
П1t= M/(1+ 1/ Gt)2             (14) 
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П2t= M/(1+ Gt)2         (15) 
and  
R&D cost of firm 1 =  h
Gtt 11
σα            (16) 








        (17) 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
Stage 1 (The Open-Loop Formulation) 
The pair (θ1, θ2) is called an open-loop Nash equilibrium with function θj mapping 
t [ )T,0∈   to a real number if for each j = 1, 2 , an optimal control path αj(.) of the 
problem below exists  and is given by αj(t)= θj(t).60 As shown below the optimal control 
is performed with this definition as a basis. It is also important to note that, unlike the 
case described by Vencatachellum (1998), the open-loop Nash equilibrium in our model 
does not coincide with the myopic strategy whereby the firm does not take into account 
the productivity of its rival while choosing its optimal path.61 Firm 1’s dynamic 



























s.t  ( ) tt GG 21. αα −=  , G0 is given, GT ≥ 0 as T →∞ and α1t≥ 0    (18) 
                                                 
60 The general case is formulated by Dockner et al. (2000). We assume an open-loop equilibrium as in 
Peretto (1996) since we are unable to find a closed-form solution to analyze the properties of the model for 
a closed-loop or Markov perfect equilibrium. In principle, if the objective function is of linear quadratic 
form, the closed-loop equilibrium can be found by setting the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation. 
61  This special case arises since the Hamiltonian of one firm is linear and separable in its rival’s stock of 
human capital and hence, the latter term vanishes at the first order condition. 
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⎡ −+= −∞ −∫ 22 2202 1max σρα α  
s.t  ( ) tt GG 21. αα −=  ,G0 is given, GT ≥ 0 as T →∞ and α2t≥ 0    (19) 
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Transversality conditions  
∞→T
Lim  e-ρt λ1T=0 if GT >0  
∞→T
Lim  e-ρt λ1T≥0 if GT =0  
Combining and from Kuhn Tucker again we have, 
∞→T
Lim  e-ρt λ1T GT = 0     (23) 
The Hamiltonian function for firm 2 can be written as  






11 ααλα σ −+⋅−+= −        (24) 






dH αα  







G αλαλ σσ (Kuhn Tucker conditions) (25) 









12 ααλσαρλλ σ −−−++= +−           (26) 
Transversality conditions  
∞→T
Lim  e-ρt λ2T=0 if GT >0  
∞→T
Lim  e-ρt λ2T≥0 if GT =0  
Combining and from Kuhn Tucker again we have, 
∞→T
















4.1 Steady State 
We now characterize the steady state of the economy by finding the steady state of 
one industry and assuming that all other industries are operating at their respective steady 
state levels. As in Traca and Reis (2003), we found that at the steady state the leader’s 
rate of innovation equals the follower’s rate of imitation. Formally, the dynamic 
equilibrium in our model has the following properties at the steady state:  
(i) At the steady state α1 = α2. 
(ii) X0>ρ is a sufficient condition for both α1and α2 to be positive at time t = 0 
where X0 ≡ 2Mh(G0+1)-3 and G0 denotes Gt at time t = 0. 
(iii)  The solution Gs to max{XsZs, XsYs}= ρ is a stagnation steady state with 
neither innovation nor imitation if min{XsZs, XsYs}< ρ 





12 σ−≡ ss GY  
where G0 denotes Gs at the steady state. 
Proof: See Appendix 
We can now formulate the main propositions of this paper. 
4.2 Imitation and Appropriability in the transitional dynamics 
 We saw that rates of innovation and imitation are equal at the steady state. As a 
corollary, we also have that an increase in imitation by the follower leads to an increase 
in innovation by the leader and since their constant growth rate is the only variable 
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growing in the representative industry we infer that such an increase would raise the 
economy’s growth rate. Hence by increasing imitation, laggards put pressure on the 
industry leader to innovate more and it is this interaction which, in turn, drives the 
economy’s engine of growth. Yet another corollary of the previous subsection is that at 
the steady state the growth rate of the technology gap is zero; thus the market 
configuration is stable at the steady state. Similar results were also obtained by Traca and 
Reis (2003). We next show that these results remain robust in the transitional dynamics 
under some assumptions on the gap. 
Proposition 4.2.1(Imitation) 
For large technology gaps, imitation and innovation are strategic complements in their 
transitional dynamics; that is an increase in imitation by the laggard leads to an increase 
in innovation by the leader if the technology gap is large enough. 
Proof: 
From (A21), we know that 
ρασ −= ttt ZX12                (28) 
Given Xt and Zt from (ii) and (iii) 












MhG                        (29) 
We want to find the effect of a change in α2t on α1t .Since from (A24 ) we know that α2t and 
Gt are negatively related for all Gt>2 , it suffices to show that α2t and Gt are negatively 


















α σ           (30) 
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The above term is negative if and only if 
( ) ( ) 22222 13332
tt
t GG
G ++>−+− σσσσ                (31) 
Given our earlier parameter restrictions on (8) and (9), (31) is true by definition. Hence 
by chain rule, the impact of α2t on α1t is positive.▪ 
Proposition 4.2.1 shows that through the establishment of an important long-run 
relationship between imitation and innovation the steady state result also holds during the 
transitional dynamics under the assumption of large technology gaps. In this dynamic 
game between the two firms with imitation and innovation as strategic variables, we 
observe that at any point in time an increase in imitation rate by the follower will prompt 
the leader to increase his innovation rate as long as the latter has a significant advantage 
over the former. Since there are only two variables growing in the representative 
industry62 and the dynamic relationship between them is positive, it must be the case that 
the dynamic interactions between those firms will make the industry competitive at all 
times. In other words, process imitation creates a source of competitive pressure which 
deters the leader from maximizing short-run monopoly profits but rather “forces” him to 
innovate further. 
 The restriction of large gaps (Gt>2 as shown in the appendix) ensures that 
no leapfrogging takes place in our model. For small technology gaps, the relationship 
between imitation and innovation is no longer positive as the leader does not have enough 
productivity lead and anticipates that the imitator might close the gap by feeding off the 
                                                 
62 Recall that the economy consists of n such prototypes and hence the economy should be growing at the 
rate of growth of the representative industry. 
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intra-industry spillovers. Our assumption of large gaps therefore rules out such 
possibilities. Moreover, Aghion et.al’s (2001) findings that both firms have lower R&D 
incentives is the special case when the gap equals zero give some insights to our 
assumption. 
The proof for proposition 4.2.1 is instructive since crucial to its construction is the 
mechanism which explains the above result. This is due to the fact that we derived the 
effect of imitation on the technology gap first, followed by finding the effect of the latter 
on innovation and eventually inferred the result by simple chain rule. Hence, imitation 
first reduces the gap (assuming the gap is not too narrow), and the leader receiving the 
signal that his technological advantage is shrinking puts in effort to restore his lead. We 
can also see that without the restriction of large technology gaps, an increase in the 
technology gap can potentially increase imitation and that the best response of the leader 
then would be to reduce his innovation to prevent the imitator from benefiting from the 
positive externalities generated by his activities. Thus in this case the follower is 
considered as too close to the leader for the latter to allow him to free-ride. Our 
restriction rules out the occurrence of the above scenario. While proposition 4.2.1 makes 
a strong case for reverse engineering, it also strengthens the results of most non-
Schumpeterian models. 
Proposition 4.2.2 (Spillovers) 
In the transitional dynamics, due to the existence of a non-Schumpeterian effect, an 
industry with a relatively lower degree of appropriability does not necessarily grow at a 
slower rate; that is, an increase in the ease of spillovers or an improvement in the reverse 
engineering environment does not necessarily lead to a fall in the rate of innovation. 
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Proof: 











σρσα ttt ZX         (32) 
We observe that there are two components affecting α1t.Since ρ is constant, the effect of a 
change in σ2 on α1t due to the second component of the RHS of (32) is positive. The effect 
of σ2 on α1t due to the first component depends on the effect of σ2 on XtZt which in turn 
depends on the time path of Gt .The latter in equilibrium will depend on σ2 ,σ1 and t. 












In this case the first component is the usual Schumpeterian effect and the second 
component, which is unambiguously positive, is our postulated non-Schumpeterian effect. 










In this case we only have a non-Schumpeterian effect. 
But (i) and (ii) imply that the effect of an increase in σ2 on α1t is at least ambiguous. 
Therefore we conclude that an increase in σ2 does not necessarily reduce α1t . ▪63 
Proposition 4.2.2 shows that laws prohibiting process reverse engineering or 
policies designed to mitigate factors promoting it are not justifiable at least from the 
economic growth perspective. It demonstrates the impact of a decrease in appropriability 
(increase in σ2) on the leader’s Nash equilibrium value of innovation. We find that a 
                                                 
63 Note that for case (i), there will always exist a level of the discount factor which would  ensure a  non-
Schumpeterian effect. 
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higher patent protection rate in an industry does not increase innovation unambiguously 
since there exists a non-Schumpeterian effect working in the opposite direction of the 
Schumpeterian effect. Thus the heterogeneity in spillovers with a higher weight given to 
the one accrued by the imitator allows us to separate the impact of a general industry-
level externality (σ1) and externalities which enhance imitative behavior (σ2). This result 
gives some theoretical insight into Cohen and Levinthal’s (1989) empirical studies in 
which they conclude that the negative incentives effect of spillovers and hence the 
advantages of policies designed to mitigate them might not be as great as supposed. It 
also helps shed some light on the recent law debates surrounding the advantages and 
disadvantages of legalizing the act of reverse engineering. 
Proposition 4.2.3 (technology gap) 
If the level of appropriability in an industry is bounded from below64 , then St ≤ 0 is a 























tttt GGGS  ; that is this condition 
ensures the existence of a Saddle-path to the steady state. Moreover this leads to a stable 
market configuration. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 Proposition 4.2.3 shows that as long as the specified condition on the technology 
gap is satisfied, the latter will always converge and the dynamic system is stable. 
Although it is a prima facie that this condition is merely to satisfy some technical 
conditions in control theoretic models, two important corollaries arise from it. First, as 
described in footnote 5, since the market share of a firm depends on the size of the 
                                                 
64 This is equivalent to saying that σ2  is bounded from above. 
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technology gap, the degree of competition or monopolization will be determined by the 
dynamics of the latter. Now, since from proposition 4.2.3 we know that the path of 
technology gap converges and is stable, we can infer that the market structure or 
configuration is stable in the transitional dynamics under the given condition.65 
 The second interesting corollary to emerge from the above proposition is that the 
condition given will impose on the gap an upper bound to which its path converges 
asymptotically. This means that a gap which is very large is not feasible in our model 
since there will be excessive free-riding from imitation. If we had allowed for the latter to 
occur by relaxing the condition in proposition 3.2.3, it would have been feasible that the 
leader might find it optimal not to innovate at all at some point in time. One can also 
observe that by the definition of Gt the lower bound for technology gap is 1. Now, given 
the latter and the upper bound restriction of proposition 3.2.3, we conclude that the 
technology gap and hence the market configuration is bounded in this model. Thus, the 
symmetric case where competition is neck and neck (when the gap tends to zero) and 
pure monopolization (when the gap tends to infinity) is never attained in the transitional 
dynamics. Hence, there is always (at any point in time) a follower who will prompt the 
leader to innovate further in such a market configuration and this will lead to higher 
growth. It is also noteworthy that the above phenomenon might be due to increasing 
returns on the R&D when the gap is large.66 According to Glass (2000), an important 
factor in  Japan’s recent economic slowdown is that they have exhausted all imitation 
possibilities as they move closer to the world’s technology frontier. 
Proposition 4.2.4 (Policy Implication) 
                                                 
65 Of course the rate of growth of technology gap at the steady state is zero. 
66 See Peretto (1996) for further comment. 
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If the level of appropriability in an industry and the technology gap are bounded from 
below, the equilibrium with innovation and imitation as dynamic strategic complements 
exists, is unique, and is stable; that is, by choosing the spillover parameter, the policy 
maker can ensure the existence and uniqueness of a steady state with Saddle-path where 
imitation and innovation are positively related assuming that the gap is not too narrow. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Proposition 4.2.4 shows that the policy maker can maneuver the nature of 
dynamic equilibrium by choosing the level of appropriability (inversely related to σ2 ). To 
see this, let us think of the game in our model as a three stage game with a “pseudo” first 
stage in which the policy maker chooses σ2 –σ1 once and leaves it there.67 Thus, by the 
same logic of backward induction described in earlier sections, the latter, acting like a 
“Stackelberg leader”, can ensure the stability of equilibrium with a large technology gap 
and in which imitation and innovation are dynamic strategic complements. It is therefore 
possible that the policy maker can promote growth by choosing a lower bound level of 
appropriability (upper bound to σ2 ) 
It is also important to note that, as in proposition 4.2.1, this proposition also 
depends on the assumption of large technology gaps (Gt>2); for if it does not hold, the 
proof shows that the equilibrium with imitation and innovation as dynamic strategic 
substitutes can be stable. One possible explanation for our result not holding for narrow 
technology gaps, aside from the one given earlier ( that the follower is “too close” to the 
leader for the latter to allow him to continue free-riding), is that the follower’s marginal 
imitation induces relatively lower change in his market share as compared to when the 
                                                 
67 The choice is a one-shot action in this stage as compared to the second stage in which the choices are 
sequential. 
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gap is large. In economic terms, there is decreasing returns to scale as the technology gap 
narrows. This fact is also confirmed by empirical findings in the literature. (see Glass 






















5. Concluding Remarks 
 We have presented an analytical model that deals with process imitation and 
spillovers in a non-Schumpeterian framework. Our motivation comes mainly from an 
apparent lacuna in existing non-Schumpeterian models in showing the interrelation 
between process imitation and spillovers and their impact on growth. Moreover, existing 
Schumpeterian models, lack adequate empirical evidence to explain growth using the 
concept of creative destruction. Indeed most of these studies rely heavily on the price 
undercutting mechanism of the homogeneous Bertrand game. We demonstrate without 
relaxing the assumption of product homogeneity that competitive behavior can still 
prevail by using a Cournot quantity competition setting. Two main factors drive 
competitive behavior in the long-run; firstly, imitation by the follower and, secondly, 
spillovers occurring due to a lack of appropriability. 
 The paradigm proposed in this paper can offer a basis for understanding how the 
dynamic strategic interactions between two firms with a technology gap can determine 
the economy’s growth rate. In particular, imitation acts as a spur by putting pressure on 
the industry leader to innovate further and this drives the economy’s engine of growth. 
Furthermore, this research can contribute to the literature on “The Law and Economics of 
Reverse Engineering” (See for example, Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2002) by providing 
some economic grounds in favor of process reverse engineering. In this regard, it 
demonstrates the existence of a non-Schumpeterian element in the innovator’s best 
response function. One immediate policy implication of our model is that laws and 
regulations which hinder process imitation might not always be a good thing in an 
industry characterized by spillovers. 
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 An obvious extension of our analysis would be to consider alterations to the 
duopolistic structure. While we measure market configuration (or relative monopolistic 
structure vis-à-vis competition) only by the technology gap between the two firms, we do 
not allow for entry (see footnote 6). However, we also believe that more firms entering 
the industry could only mean more competition and this would provide a case for non- 
Schumpeterian models. Further research might address the issue of entry in industries 
with more than two firms, or consider closed-loop games formulation rather than the 


















6.1 Derivation of the second stage quantity, profit, and R&D cost functions 
In this section we derive (12)-(17). 
From (11), firm j’s problem is given by 
jq
Max    Mqj/(qj +qi )  - cj qj   ,  j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j               (11) 
FOC for firm j is given by 
(qj +qi )M - qjM  - cj(qj +qi )2  = 0                              (A1) 
By symmetry we have, 
(qi +qj )M – qiM  - ci(qi +qj )2  = 0                              (A2) 
Simplifying gives 
 qiM  - cj(qj +qi )2  = 0                               (A3) 
 qjM  - ci(qi +qj )2  = 0                               (A4) 
Solving  (A3) and  (A4) simultaneously gives (12) 
Replacing (12) for both firms in (4) gives Pt 
Pt - cj = ci/(cj + ci)2         (A5) 
Thus the profit for firm j is given by 
(Pt - cj) qj = Пj               (A6) 
(A6) verifies (13) 
Using (6) and (13) for firm 1 we have 
П1= M(1/A2)2/(1/A2+ 1/A1)2         (A7) 
П2= M(1/A1)2/(1/A2+ 1/A1)2         (A8) 
(9), (A7) and (A8) give (14) and (15) 







α&                                                              (A9) 
Now using (A9) , (8) ,(9) combined with the fact that wage rate =1  give (16) and (17) 
6.2 Proof for (i) – (iii) of the steady state. 
(i)  Assuming 01 >tα  in the case where the first order condition of the control variable is 








λ          (A10) 
Taking the derivative of (A10) w.r.t time we have 




1 αασλ σ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= −                         (A11) 
Combining (22), (A10) ,(A11) by substituting Xt ,Yt , Zt  where needed and simplifying, 
we have 
( )( ) ( ) ttttttt YX−−−+=−− 2111211 1 ααασραασ           (A12) 
We prove (i), that is, that α1t = α2t by contradiction. 
Suppose not, then there are two possibilities : (a) α1t > α2t ,(b) α1t < α2t 
Case (a) If α1t > α2t ≥ 0, then Gt →∞ as T→∞ 
Now since XtYt depend on Gt, it can be shown using L’Hopital rule that as Gt →∞   
XtYt→068 
Using the above fact and simplifying (A12) gives 
1
2 σ
ρα −=t                            (A13) 
But this is a contradiction since for all ρ>0 and σ1>0 , α2t <0 contradicts α1t > α2t ≥ 0 
                                                 
68 Proof can be provided upon request. 
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Case (b) If α2t > α1t ≥ 0, then Gt →0 as T→∞ 
Now since XtYt depend on Gt, it can be shown using L’Hopital rule that as Gt →0, 
XtYt→∞. 
Using the above fact and simplifying (A12) gives 
ttt YX−=− ρσα 12    as  XtYt→∞               (A14) 
But this implies that α2t  →∞   which gives a contradiction to [ )∞∈ ,02tα  for all t. 
Since (a) and (b) are not possible, it must be that  α1t = α2t. ▪ 
For consistency sake we show that the proof can also be derived from firm 2’s behavior. 
Assuming 02 >tα  in the case where the first order condition of the control variable is 







         (A15) 














                        (A16) 
Combining (26), (A15) ,(A16) by substituting Xt ,Yt , Zt  where needed and simplifying, 
we have 
( )( ) ( ) ttttttt ZX+−+−−=−+ 2122212 1 ααασραασ           (A17) 
We prove (i), that is, that α1t = α2t by contradiction. 
Suppose not, then there are two possibilities : (a) α1t > α2t ,(b) α1t <  α2t 
Case (a) If α1t > α2t ≥ 0, then Gt →∞ as T→∞ 
Now since XtZt depend on Gt, it can be shown using L’Hopital rule that as Gt →∞    
XtZt→0 
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Using the above fact and simplifying (A12) gives 
2
1 σ
ρα −=t                            (A18) 
But this is a contradiction since for all ρ>0 and σ1>0, α1t <0 contradicts α1t > α2t ≥ 0 
Case (b) If α2t > α1t ≥ 0, then Gt →0 as T→∞ 
Now since XtZt depend on Gt , it can be shown using L’Hopital rule that as Gt →0   
XtZt→∞. 
Using the above fact and simplifying (A12) gives 
ttt ZX−=− ρσα 21    as  XtZt→∞               (A19) 
But this implies that α1t  →∞  which yields a contradiction to  α2t > α1t and [ )∞∈ ,02tα for 
all t. 
Since (a) and (b) are not possible, it must be that  α1t = α2t. ▪ 
(ii) We now show that as assumed by (i), α1and α2 are indeed positive at the steady state. 
(A14) can be rewritten as 
ρσα −= ttt YX12                              (A20) 
By visual inspection of (A20), we see that ρ>00YX  as initial condition at t = 0 is a 
sufficient condition for α2 to be positive in the initial state. 
Also, (A19) can be rewritten as 
ρσα −= ttt ZX21                          (A21) 
By visual inspection of (A21), we see that ρ>00ZX  as initial condition at t = 0 is a 
sufficient condition for α2 to be positive in the initial state. 
But since both Y0 and Z0 are > 1 by definition, it must be that  
X0 > ρ is a sufficient condition for both α1and α2 to be positive at time t = 0.▪ 
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(iii) Those conditions can easily be inferred from (A20) and (A21). 
 
6.3 Proof for negative relationship between α2t and Gt for large Gt. 


































          (A23) 
The above term is negative if and only if  
( ) 2 1111 23331
tt
t GG
G σσσσ −+−>++                   (A24) 
Given our earlier parameter restrictions on (8) and (9), (A24) is true for all Gt>2.▪ 
6.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2.3 
Using (A12) and (10) by letting ttt gGG =/
.
, we have 
  tttt YXg −+= 111 ασρσ                   (A25) 
Using (A17) and (10) by letting ttt gGG =/
.
, we have 
tttt ZXg −+=− 222 ασρσ                                    (A26) 
From (A25), we have 
111 /)( σσρα tttt YXg ++−=                                                          (A27) 
From (A26), we have  
212 /)( σσρα tttt ZXg +−−=                                 (A28) 
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Solving (A27), (A28) and (10) by letting ttt gGG =/
.












YXZXg                           (A29) 



















































                                                                                                                    (A30) 
 For σ2 –σ1→0 (which can hold only if σ2 is bounded from above), the RHS of (A30) is 























tttt GGGS ≤ 0                     (A31) 
This completes the proof.▪ 
6.5 Proof of Proposition 4.2.4 
 Using (A29) and the fact that at the steady state 0=tg , we have  
( ) 1212 σσσσρ tttt ZXYX −=−                                     (A32) 




















2 21 σσ σσ +− > tt GG (given our early parameter restrictions σ2 ,σ1<1/2 , σ2 >σ1 and 
Gt>1), we observe from (A33) that as σ2 – σ1→0 (assuming that if σ2 is bounded from 
above), there exists some tG   such that the RHS of (A33) > LHS of (A33). Hence, we 
have tG   where  ∞<< tG1  such that RHS> LHS. Now it can also be shown that both the 
RHS and LHS of (A33) are monotonically increasing and convex for our early parameter 
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restrictions σ2 ,σ1<1/2 , σ2 >σ1 and Gt>169. Thus by visual inspection of (A33), we see 
that as Gt →∞, the LHS of (A33) > RHS of (A33) since the power of the terms in Gt of 
the LHS are always higher than that of the RHS. Therefore, given the monotonocity of 
the LHS and the RHS, we infer that there exists some tG   such that the LHS of (A33) > 
RHS of (A33). Hence we have tG   where  ∞<<< tt GG1  such that LHS> RHS. Using 
(A33), we define a function Ft given by 

















GGF       (A34) 
As noted above, for some Gt , RHS> LHS and for some Gt, LHS> RHS. Thus for some 
Gt , Ft is positive and for some Gt , Ft is negative. It well-known from the Weierstrass 
Intermediate Value Theorem that if a continuous function on an interval is sometimes 
positive and sometimes negative, it must be zero at some point. Let this point be *tG  . 
This proves the existence of a fixed point such that ∞<<<< ttt GGG *1 . The proof for 
uniqueness follows from the monotonocity of  both sides off (A33). 
We now prove for Saddle path stability assuming σ2 – σ1→0 (this can hold if σ2 is 
bounded from above). 
We observe that for earlier parameter restrictions σ2 ,σ1<1/2 , σ2 >σ1 and Gt>1, the fourth 
term of  (A31) is larger than its first term. A sufficient condition for stability is therefore 
that the second term is larger than the third term. This is true if and only if  
                                                 

















⎡ −>tG                       (A36)     This 
establishes a lower bound for the technology gap which will ensure stability. Hence if the 








⎡ −>tG  ) and the level of appropriability is bounded 
from below (σ2 is bounded from above and thus, σ2 – σ1→0), the system is stable. We 
now show that the equilibrium with   innovation and imitation as dynamic strategic 
complements is stable. 
Recall from Proposition 4.2.1 that if Gt>2, innovation and imitation are strategic 
complements in their transitional dynamics. In other words, we need the lower bound on 
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σ −−>−                             (A38)                
But (A38)  holds by definition given our  parameter restrictions. Hence, the path on 
which  innovation and imitation are strategic complements is a Saddle path. This 








IV. Economic Growth and Process Spillovers with Step-by-Step Innovation  
 
 
                                                           Abstract 
  
This paper extends previous research on the effects of process imitation on 
economic growth by accounting for stochastic intra-industry spillovers. We employ a 
non-Schumpeterian growth model to determine the impact of such spillovers on 
investment in industries where firms are either neck-and-neck or unleveled. Our central 
finding is that, in an economy where the representative industry is a duopoly, R&D 
spillovers positively affect economic growth. While other non-Schumpeterian models 
assume that the imitation rate of laggard firms is unaffected by the R&D effort of the 
leader firm, we consider the case where the latter’s R&D activity generates some positive 
externality on its rivals’ research. In this construct, the duopolists in each industry play a 
two-stage game. In the first stage, they invest in R&D which can reduce their costs of 
production only if they successfully innovate and they compete with each other by using 
Markovian strategies. In the second stage, they compete in the product market. At any 
point in time, an industry can either be in the neck-and-neck state or in an unleveled state 
where the leader is n steps ahead of the follower. At the steady state, the inflow of firms 
to an industry must be equal to the outflow. By determining the steady state investment 
levels of each industry, we demonstrate a positive monotonic relationship between the 
spillover rate and economic growth.                                                                                                                     
 
Keywords: Step-by-Step Innovation, non-Schumpeterian Growth, Process Spillovers, 
Imitation. 








Endogenous growth theorists have investigated extensively the impact of low 
appropriability on the growth rate of an economy. While Schumpeterian models70 posit a 
negative relationship between them, more recently developed non-Schumpeterian models 
have shown that the relationship is non-monotonic and that a strict negative relationship 
only holds whenever the level of appropriability is very low.71 Aghion et al. (2001) made 
a seminal contribution to the non-Schumpeterian branch of endogenous growth by 
showing that static monopoly is not always a necessary evil for long-run efficiency in a 
step-by-step innovation growth model (referred to as the AHV model). Their result is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Blundell, Griffith and Reenen (1995), Nickell et 
al. (1996) and the theoretical predictions of D’Aspremont et al. (2002).72 The AHV 
model, together with contributions noted above, however, downplay the role of 
externalities in strategic interactions among firms. In contrast, an important strand in the 
industrial organization (IO) literature argues that process spillovers play a key role in two 
stage non-cooperative R&D games73 because they capture the diffusion of technology 
between leaders and laggards. Since such externalities depend on the level of 
appropriability in an industry, the effect of lower or higher appropriability on growth can 
be observed by the impact of spillovers on the latter. The purpose of this study is to 
determine the effects of process R&D spillovers on growth by extending the AHV 
framework. 
                                                 
70 See Gossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom (1991). 
71 In particular, they find an inverted-U shaped relationship between innovation and a parameter which 
promotes competition in their models. 
72 Blundell et al. (1995) found that the firm’s market power and R&D competition are not necessarily 
negatively related, Nickell (1996) provides the empirical evidence that a larger number of firms is usually 
associated with a higher level of productivity. 
73 D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1989) pioneered this framework. 
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The relationship between spillovers and R&D incentives has two aspects. First, in 
many industries, firms undertake R&D investments in order to develop new products or 
processes. One feature of R&D investment that distinguishes itself from other forms of 
investment is that firms which do the investing are often not able to exclude others from 
freely benefiting from their investments. Thus, the benefits from R&D investments spill 
over to other firms in the economy.74 Now since the laggards can improve their own 
technology by free-riding on the leader’s research, technologically more advanced firms 
might have a disincentive to undertake more research since their productivity lead might 
be significantly reduced in the presence of such spillovers. Hence, the first characteristic 
of R&D spillovers is that it can potentially reduce research incentives. The second aspect 
of spillovers is related to the concept of “escape competition”.75 When the laggard firms 
benefit from process R&D spillovers, they improve their own technology and thereby 
reduce the technology gap76 between the leader and themselves. As a result, there will be 
competitive pressure on the leader to innovate further to maintain its lead. Those two 
opposing forces of spillovers on R&D are observed in the empirical findings of Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989).77 Given the importance of spillovers in the strategic interactions 
between firms investing in R&D, we allow them to play a major role in our model. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the interdependence of spillovers, 
appropriability and growth in a framework where strategic interactions between firms are 
taken into account. Our work is primarily motivated by the empirical study of Zachariadis 
                                                 
74 Griliches (1979) emphasized the significance of spillovers in modeling and estimating the effects of 
R&D investments. 
75 “Escape competition” refers to the motive of innovating in order to escape competition; that is, firms in 
the neck-and-neck state will innovate to obtain a productivity lead over their rivals. 
76 Cameron (1999) found that there were more free-riding or imitation possibilities when the technology 
gap is large than when it was low. 
77 They found, contrary to previous studies, that intra-industry spillovers may encourage rather than deter 
R&D investment. 
97 
(2003) who finds strong support for technological spillovers from aggregate research 
intensity to industry-level innovation success.78 We develop a dynamic general 
equilibrium model which is distinct from the AHV model in two major ways. First, we 
consider the case for homogeneous Cournot competition rather than differentiated 
Bertrand competition.79 Secondly, we assume the hazard rate of imitation to be dependent 
on the spillovers induced by the leader’s R&D. Thus, owing to the presence of 
externalities, the probability of the laggard making a successful innovation is a fraction of 
the leader’s probability of doing so. We therefore highlight the role of spillovers in an 
economy in which firms play a differential R&D game. We consider a one-sector 
endogenous growth model whereby in the second stage, duopolists in the representative 
industry sell a homogenous good to consumers who spend a fixed proportion of their 
income in each period.80 In the first stage, while the industry leader innovates and moves 
one step up the technology ladder with some probability, the follower imitates and 
catches up with the leader with some hazard rate. Thus, at any point in time, we can have 
industries in different states with the technology gap ranging from 0 to n.81 Stationarity 
implies that for some state n, the inflow of industries in that state should be equal to the 
outflow. By computing the growth rate at the steady state, we derive two sets of results. 
First, as in the AHV model, we look at the case where the innovation lead of the 
leader is so high that it has no incentive to increase its lead by one step. This 
simplification allows us to reduce the number of states to only state 0 and state 1. By 
                                                 
78 They used US manufacturing data to estimate a system of three equations implied by a model of R&D 
induced growth at the steady state. 
79 Although, in another paper, Aghion et al. (1997) compared the Bertrand and the Cournot cases, they did 
not allow the industry leader to extend its lead by more than one step in their model. 
80 This simplification, also found in Grossman and Helpman (1991), Segerstrom (1991) and AHV (2001), 
“transfers” the dynamics from the consumer side to the producer side of the economy. 
81 Note that state 0 is also known as the neck-and neck-state. 
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computing the fraction of industries in those states and by deriving the optimal neck-and- 
neck and unleveled innovation rates82, we can derive the steady state growth rate of the 
economy by using the stationarity condition that the fraction of industries in every state is 
constant in long-run equilibrium. We then use comparative statics to find the impact of 
the spillover parameter on the growth rate and consider whether lack of appropriablity 
necessarily reduces the growth rate for the case of a large innovation lead. 
Secondly, we consider the case where the innovation lead can be small and hence, 
in the case at hand, the leader has incentives to extend its lead further than one step. 
While AHV (2001) use a method of asymptotic expansion to derive results for the “small 
innovation lead” case, our results are derived directly from the Bellman’s equations since 
our assumption of Cournot competition allows our profit functions to be independent of 
the competition parameter as opposed to the differentiated Bertrand case. Thus, we also 
solve for the optimum R&D effort of the leader who wants to move more than one step 
ahead of its follower and derive the fraction of industries which might be in that state in 
equilibrium.83 We shall then have three optimal levels of R&D effort as well as three 
steady state fractions of industries in the respective states. Results are derived in a similar 
fashion as in the previous case with “large innovation lead” and we can therefore analyze 
how the policymaker, by varying the appropriability rate of the industry, can affect the 
research incentives in the neck-and-neck state, as well as the unleveled states. Some 
policy implications on whether larger appropriability promotes growth are then drawn. 
Our results show that the growth rate is unaffected by the spillover rate for the 
“large innovation lead” case. Thus, in contrast to the traditional Schumpeterian argument, 
                                                 
82 As in AHV, the innovation rate refers to the probability of success of R&D. 
83 For simplicity, we shall consider only states 0,1,2. 
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we find that lower appropriability does not necessarily reduce growth, when the rate of 
imitation depends on the R&D spillovers. Moreover, we find as in the AHV model that 
the level of R&D effort is greatest at the neck-and-neck state and that this constitutes a 
major component of the economy’s growth rate. For the case of “small innovation lead”, 
our findings indicate that process spillovers affect growth positively and that imitation 
and innovation can be strategic substitutes.84 We also note that the fraction of industries 
in the state in which the leader is more than one step ahead is positively related to the 
spillover rate and to the R&D effort in the neck-and-neck state. Clearly, it follows from 
our results that the trade-off between short-run monopoly and long-run efficiency is not 
observable in a framework where both strategic interactions between firms and diffusion 
of technology are taken into account. Hence, an immediate policy implication is that 
greater appropriability is not always good for the growth rate of the economy. 
On the normative side, one interpretation of the main result is that the more 
technologically advanced firm will innovate even further in the face of process spillovers 
in order to maintain its productivity lead. It is noteworthy that unlike the AHV result, 
ours is not heavily dependent on the product differentiability parameter. Thus, the model 
identifies the “pure” effect of process spillovers, which enhance imitation, on welfare. 
Specifically, imitation and unintended technological diffusion can promote growth. As a 
consequence, we shed some light on the ongoing debate as to whether or not restricting 
the act of reverse engineering is justifiable on economic grounds.85 We believe that in an 
industry where reverse engineering can hasten the diffusion of technology via process 
spillovers, the strategic interaction between rival firms will guarantee that a competitive 
                                                 
84  While R&D effort in the neck-and-neck state is negatively related to the imitation rate of the laggard, it 
is positively related to the innovation rate of the leader. 
85 See Scotchmer and Samuelson (2002) and Handa (1995). 
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environment always prevails. Furthermore, the innovator does not have an incentive to 
lay back as a monopolist as its technological lead might fall. Hence, growth is always 
enhanced by more competition. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the 
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the formal model, derives the steady state growth 




















2. Related Work 
 In this section we briefly review some related studies. It was recognized in the 
early work of Ruff (1969) that it is very difficult to decide whether the Schumpeterian 
argument that the static inefficiency of less competitive firms was more than offset by 
superior dynamic performance. Ruff analyzed the symmetric equilibrium in a multi-firm 
economy86 and concluded that technological progress will be optimal in an economy if 
research opportunities, population and the initial technological level are large enough and 
the discount rate is small enough. Also, he found that dynamic efficiency can be achieved 
in an economy where firms form a cooperative research lab. Recent work has criticized 
Ruff’s assumption of non-Markovian strategies in a noncooperative differential game 
setting since members are not allowed to respond to feedback during the game. However, 
in spite of this limitation, his assumption of a dynamic Cournot economy best describes 
industries in which firms undertake process R&D. In our model, we consider a dynamic 
Cournot economy where firms play Markovian strategies while choosing their R&D 
levels. 
 The prevailing paradigm stems from Schumpeter’s idea of creative destruction.87 
In a model of vertical innovations, Aghion and Howitt (1992) showed that the prospect 
for more future research discourages current research by threatening to destroy rents 
created by the latter. This finding was substantiated by Grossman and Helpman (1991a; 
1991b), Segerstrom (1991) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). Some of these studies 
point out the role of ongoing product-upgrading and product cycles in characterizing the 
                                                 
86 This has also been referred to as the Cournot economy. 
87 See Schumpeter (1934) for more details. 
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steady state equilibrium. In particular, the firm holding the state-of-the-art, that is the one 
with the lowest price adjusted quality acts as monopolist in the representative industry. 
Moreover, due to the homogenous Bertrand assumption in such models, imitation can be 
carried out only by the relatively lower cost firms, while successful innovation leads to 
instantaneous leapfrogging. These models show that, in general, three equilibria can 
exist: The monopolist is a low-cost innovator; the monopolist is a leader who has 
regained its lead from a low-cost imitator and the monopolist is an innovator who has 
leapfrogged the leader. In a related study, the idea of reverse engineering and learning to 
learn was introduced by Connolly (1997) in North-South trade models. 
 The non-Schumpeterian framework of endogenous growth was pioneered by 
Aghion et al. (1997, 2001). Our paper is closest to theirs as we also share their view that 
in an economy where imitation of the technological leader is made easier, growth is not 
negatively affected. The main argument of non-Schumpeterian models is that the leaders 
would have an incentive to innovate further in order to reestablish their lead. AHV 
(2001), in a model of growth with step-by-step innovation considered the relationship 
between product market competition and growth in which the laggard’s imitation rate is 
enhanced by its R&D investment but does not contribute to the economy’s stock of 
knowledge. While firms compete in the product market in the second stage, in the first 
stage there are three states in which R&D can take place; the neck-and-neck state, an 
unleveled state in which the leader is one step ahead and an unleveled state in which the 
leader can be more than one step ahead of its rival. They showed that the R&D level is 
higher at the neck-and-neck state and concluded that the latter state promotes growth as it 
is the only state where two firms (instead of one) are trying to advance the industry’s 
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technological frontier. Aghion et al. (1997) give an example of the above general model 
by assuming that the leader has no incentive to extend its lead by more than one step. 
 More recently, non-Schumpeterian models have supported the argument that 
imitation and more product competition can enhance economic growth. Traca and Reis 
(2003) developed an endogenous growth model of duopolistic competition in which there 
are knowledge spillovers induced by the firms’ R&D and such spillovers raise the level 
of innovation as they spur a source of competitive pressure on the leader. Spillovers 
increase innovation since they reduce the laggard’s innovation costs and this signals the 
leader to innovate further, lest it will forfeit its competitive advantage. Hence, the 
leader’s incentive to innovate increases as it anticipates that it might lose its market share. 
Thus spillovers expand the R&D of both firms. Our model differs from that of Traca and 
Reis (2003) in the following ways. First, we consider the case where the leader innovates 
and the follower imitates. Secondly, we assume a one-way spillover structure in our 
model to highlight the leader-follower configuration. Such asymmetry is not addressed in 
their paper. Another non-Schumpeterian model with no spillovers is developed by 
Mukoyama (2003), who showed that subsidizing imitation might increase the economy-
wide rate of technological progress and that competition and growth might be positively 
correlated. 
 The main point of departure of our work from the existing literature is our 
simplistic assumption of Cournot competition. The latter, in contrast to Bertrand 
competition, implies that the only way for the leader (follower) to increase its market 
share is to increase (decrease) the cost differential which is given by the technology gap, 
as will become clear in the next section. We therefore rule out the possibility of product 
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innovations as our Cournot assumption necessarily implies that all imitation and 
innovation occur at the process level. It is noteworthy that both AHV (2001) and Traca 
and Reis (2003) consider only process imitation/innovation but used the differentiated 
Bertrand assumption in which both product and process innovations are possible. In 
addition, our assumption not only allows the two firms in the representative industry to 
compete in both the product market and the R&D sector for the homogenous product case 
( in contrast to the homogenous Bertrand case), but it also helps us to derive results 
without having to depend on the product differentiability parameter as in AHV.88 We 
therefore contribute to the literature by introducing a framework of step-by-step 














                                                 
88 AHV (2001) used a transformation of product differentiability as a proxy for competition in their model. 
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3. The Model 
3.1 Overview 
 We consider a model with d goods, d industries with 2 firms each, and infinitely 
lived identical consumers. The latter face two optimization problems: temporal and 
intertemporal utility maximization. Preferences across goods and time are logarithmic. In 
the intertemporal problem the consumer chooses the optimal labor supply and 
consumption (or expenditure) for each period. The remaining income is invested in the 
industries’ R&D. To simplify the model we make the following assumptions.89 Firstly, 
we normalize expenditures to allow the rate on return to capital (savings of agents) to be 
constant and equal to the exogenously given discount rate. Moreover, we also assume 
that the risk of any firm is idiosyncratic and that the stock market values the firm so that 
its expected rate of return equals the risk free interest rate.90 Secondly, we assume that 
labor supply is perfectly elastic.91With the optimal amount to be spent in each period 
chosen, the representative agent can thus derive his demand function for each industry 
from his temporal optimization problem. 
 On the production side, the industry demand is derived from the consumer 
problem and taking the demand schedule as given, the duopolists in the representative 
industry compete in Cournot fashion to choose their respective output and research 
intensities (which are innovation rate for the leader and imitation rate for the laggard). If 
the productivity of one firm is higher than its competitor, then the former is the leader 
and the latter is the follower. Moreover, the leader moves up the technology ladder with a 
Poisson hazard rate by employing some units of labor, while the follower catches up with 
                                                 
89 These do not lead to loss of generality in our propositions. 
90 This is similar to Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
91 This follows from Aghion et al (2001). 
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some Poisson hazard rate which consists of two components (one of which is 
proportional to the leader’s success rate). The leader does not benefit in terms of 
externality from the follower, while the latter which practices process reverse engineering 
benefits from the leader. 
 The choices of the firm’s variables which are quantity and research intensities are 
found sequentially. We therefore use backward induction in a two-stage non cooperative 
game setting to formulate the firms’ optimum behavior. In the second stage the firms play 
a Cournot game to determine their respective quantities. Their respective profits as 
functions of their productivity92 levels can thus be derived. In the first stage, the leader 
(follower) plays a differential game to choose its optimal innovation (imitation) in each 
possible state taking the technology gap as given. The Markovian Nash equilibrium is 
then found. The steady state growth rate is determined by the optimal values of imitation 
and innovation and is used to derive results. The effects of changes in appropriability and 
growth are subsequently analyzed.  
3.2 Formal Model 
Consumers  
Let  d , Ct , Lt , Qit , Rt and Wt be the number of industries, the consumption of the 
representative agent, his labor supply, quantity produced in the industry i for i =      
1,2...,d, the interest rate and the wage rate respectively at time t. Then the intertemporal 
preference of the agent can be written as  
( ) 0,)(
0
>−≡ ∫∞ − ρρ dtLCueU ttt    where ρ is the discount rate   (1) 
)ln()( tt CCu ≡          (2) 
                                                 
92 Productivity is defined in terms of the per unit cost as in Traca and Reis (2003). 
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The intertemporal utility maximization problem results in (i) Wt = 1 and (ii) Rt = ρ after 








itt QCu  for all t          (3) 
The static utility maximization problem results in the industry demand curve94 
it
it P
MQ =         where M = 1/d            (4) 
Producers 
Given the industry demand (4) each firm will choose its respective optimal production qijt 









                                                 
93 Let consumer’s wealth at time t be At , Pt be the price of consumption and Pt Ct =1 due to normalization, 
then we have 
H= ln(Ct) - Lt + λt(  Rt At + Wt Lt - Pt Ct ) 
dH/ dCt  = 0 implies 1/ Pt Ct = λt , but since Pt Ct =1, λt =1  
dH/ dLt  = 0 implies Wt λt = 1 and hence Wt = 1 
Also d λt / dt = ρ λ - λRt , but since λt =1, d λt / dt = 0 or ρ  - Rt= 0 and therefore Rt = ρ 
94 Static utility maximization leads to 























The logarithmic assumption leads to the following demand curve 
it
it dP
Q 1=  
 
95 In this subsection of the paper, we sometimes omit subscript i for simplicity. 
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We assume that firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. Each firm’s production 
function is given by 
qj= Aj Lj    for j =1,2                 (5) 
It can easily be inferred from (5) that the per unit cost of each firm is given by W*/ Aj 
where W* is the economy level wage rate. Also, due to our assumption Wt = 1, the per 
unit cost becomes  
  cj  = 1/ Aj                             (6)  
















2               for n = 1,2,...                           (7) 








A                                                       (8) 
Thus an increase in γ  and/or n will increase (decrease) the leader’s (follower’s) profit. 
We assume innovative and imitative activities to be randomly determined. Specifically, 
we assume (as in AHV) that the leader or a neck-and-neck firm in state n, by employing 
( )xψ  units of labor in R&D moves one step ahead with a Poisson hazard rate96 of nx for 
n = 0,1,2…, while the follower catches up with its rival with a Poisson hazard rate of 
nn hx + 97, where the R&D cost function ( )xψ  is an increasing and convex function of the 
                                                 
96 Formally, we let ( ) ( )nuxnH i=  be the hazard rate in state n where ( )nu is the hazard function. Using 
the exponential distribution which has been widely used in the literature, ( ) 1=nu  and hence ( ) ixnH =  
for firm i. 
97 In any state n, nx  is the leader’s success rate while nx  is the follower’s catching up probability. 
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R&D effort and nh is the ease of imitation or R&D spillovers parameter. We define such 
spillovers as follows 
nn bxh =                           (9) 
Our definition of spillovers is similar to Cohen and Levinthal (1989) although we 
pursue some extensions. In particular, we define spillovers to include valuable knowledge 
generated in the research process of the leader, which becomes accessible to the follower 
if and only if the latter is reverse engineering the innovator’s research process.98 Given 
that spillovers favor imitation, it becomes a better strategy for the follower to imitate by 
feeding off the leader’s innovation at least initially. Thus the follower is necessarily an 
imitator. 
 It is also implicit from our assumption that it is process imitation rather than 
product imitation which takes place in our framework. This also means that the 
conventional definition of reverse engineering as the decompilation of a finished product 
in order to gain a better understanding of how it was produced as in Handa (1995) does 
not fit well into our model. Rather we see reverse engineering as the act of extracting 
know-how or information from the industry leader  through channels like the labor 
market (turnover in R&D personnel, for example) in order to imitate the latter’s process 
(or cost-cutting) innovations.99 It is also to be noted that while AHV make use of an “ease 
to imitate” parameter and a “competition parameter” to proxy the absence of institutional, 
legal and regulatory impediments connected with patent laws and regulations, in our 
model b in (9)  includes all of these factors. 
                                                 
98 We assume, however, the follower incurs a fixed cost of undertaking reverse engineering. Such costs do 
not affect R&D decisions since they vanish when the first order conditions are found. 
99 Nevertheless, our definition still belongs to a more general class of definitions of reverse engineering. 
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 We shall consider the stationary closed-loop Nash equilibrium in Markovian 
strategies in which each firm’s R&D effort depends on its current100 state as well as its 
current R&D level and not on the industry to which the firm belongs or the time. We 
assume without loss of generality that the R&D cost function is given by 
( )
2
2xx βψ =                for 0>β                  (10) 
This completes the model. 
3.3 Solving the Model 
We solve the model by backward induction. 
Stage 2 
Using the inverse demand function (4), firm j’s profit maximization problem becomes  
Max(qj)   Mqj/(qj +qi )  - cj qj   ,  j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j     (11) 
The Cournot Nash quantity for firm j is given by 
qj= (Mci)/(cj + ci)2,   j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j                 (12) 
The profit function for firm j is given by 
Пj= (Mci2)/(cj + ci)2,   j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j                (13) 
Proof: See Appendix 
Remark 3.3.1 
For all ,1≥γ (i) ( )21 nn
M
γπ +=   is strictly decreasing in γ and ( )21 nn
M
−+= γπ   is strictly 
increasing inγ ; (ii) ( )21 n
M
γ+ = ( )21 n
M
−+ γ  = ¼M if γ =1 and ( )21 n
M
γ+ + ( )21 n
M
−+ γ  > 
                                                 
100 Note that the word “current” is used across states rather than over time. 
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½M other wise where nπ  and nπ  are the profits of the leader and the follower 
respectively in state n. 
Proof: See Appendix 
The first part of Remark 3.3.1 states that a higher (lower) relative cost, that is, the 
larger (lower) the technology gap in favor of the leader (follower) is always strictly 
advantageous to its profit. The second part of Remark 3.3.1 states firstly that when the 
firms are in the neck-and-neck state, they have equal profits and, secondly, that the sum 
of the firm’s profit in an asymmetric duopoly is larger than the sum of profits when firms 
are symmetric. Thus, when there is more than the minimal degree of competition, total 
profits are lower if firms are neck-and-neck; with identical costs than if one has a relative 
cost advantage. This fact, which is also consistent the AHV Bertrand differentiated 
product case, is important for the derivation of our results. 
Stage 1 (The Closed-Loop Formulation) 
The N-tuple ( )Nφφφ ,...,, 21  of functions { } { },..2,1,...2,1: NistateRNX imi ∈× aφ is called 
a Markovian or closed loop Nash equilibrium if, for each { },..2,1 Ni∈ a rule ( ).iu of the 
problem below exists for each player and is given by ( ) ( )( )iixu ii ,. φ= .101 
Let 0V , nV and nV  denote the expected present value of the profits of the neck-and- 
neck firm, the leader and the follower respectively. Given that the equilibrium interest 
rate equals the rate of time preference, we derive 0V , nV and nV  heuristically from the 
Bellman equations as follow: 
                                                 
101 The general case is formulated by Dockner et al. (2000). 
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βπ                    (16) 
As in AHV (14) can be interpreted as follows: the value of currently being a leader n 
steps ahead at time t equals the discounted value at time (t +dt), plus the current profit 
flow dtnπ , minus the current R&D cost ,)2(
2
dtxβ plus the expected discounted capital 
gain from innovation, thereby moving one step ahead of the follower, minus the 
discounted expected capital “loss” from having a follower catch up. Similar 
interpretations can be made for (15) and (16). For dt small, rdte rdt −≅− 1  and the second 
order terms in (dt) can be ignored. Then (14)-(16) can be rewritten as follow: 
[ ] ( )[ ]nnnnnnnnn VVbxxVVxxrV −++−+−= + 0122
βπ                           (17) 
[ ] ( )[ ]nnnnnnnnn VVbxxVVxxVr −++−+−= + 0122βπ                           (18) 








−+−+−= βπ                          (19) 
Maximizing the RHS of (17)-(19), we have 
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( ) ( )
ββ
bVVVVx nnnn












VVx −=                        (22) 
We can now use equations (17)-(22) to solve recursively for the 
sequence{ } 011 ,,, ≥++ nnnnn VVxx . 
















xxbxVr ββπ −+=                            (25) 














1 xxbxxrx +Γ=+++ −β                                   (27) 
where  
                                                 
102 Proof can be provided upon request. 
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0Γ  and 1−Γ   are given by 01 ππ −  and 10 ππ −    respectively. A corollary of Remark 3.3.1 
is that 0Γ  > 1−Γ   and this implies there is more incentive for the leader to do research in 
order to escape competition when it is in the neck-and-neck state. 
3.4 Steady state 
 We now characterize the steady state of the economy by finding the steady state 
of one industry and assuming that all other industries are operating at their respective 
steady state levels. Let nµ  denote the steady state fraction of industries with 





nµ                     (28) 
As mentioned earlier, and as in AHV, stationarity will imply that for any state n, the flow 
of industries into it should be equal to the flow out. For example, during time interval dt, 
in ( )dtbxx nnn +µ industries with technological gap 1≥n  the follower catches up with the 





µ                                                    (29) 
Also, in ( )dtx00 2µ  neck-and-neck industries one firm secures a lead, and the total flow 
of industries out of state 0 is ( )dtx002µ . We thus have 
( )nn
n
n bxxx += ∑
≥1
002 µµ                                                  (30) 
For state 1 and then for states 2≥n , we have: 
( ) 001111 2 xbxxx µµ =++            and           (31) 
( ) 11 −−=++ nnnnnn xbxxx µµ  ,       2≥n               (32) 








lim                      (33) 
As in AHV we say that an industry i is said to go through a (p+1) cycle if the 
technological gap n goes through the sequence{ }0,,1,...,1,0 pp − . Since the value of iQln  






pi pQ γ  where 
p#  is the number of  (p+1) cycles the industry has gone through over the interval. Thus 


















lim  is the asymptotic frequency of (p+1) cycles. While the latter equals the 
steady state flow of industries from state p to state 0, it is also equal to the fraction of 
industries in state p given by pµ times the probability that the follower catches up with the 
leader in such an industry. Thus, again as in AHV we have 






+=                                            (35) 







+=                                           (36) 
Proof : See Appendix. 
It is clear from (36) that the largest component of growth comes from the neck- 
and-neck state. Intuitively, this happens since there are two firms trying to advance the 
technology frontier in that state compared to only one in any other state. Hence, 
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technology would advance twice as fast on average in a neck-and-neck state if all efforts 
were the same. 
3.5 Very Large Innovative lead 
In this section, we consider the case where a one step lead is so large that the 
leader has no incentives to increase its lead by more than one step. In other words, we 
consider the case where ∞→γ . Thus in this section the maximum permissible lead is 
one step. Consequently, 01 =x . 
Proposition 3.4.1 
Assume that the conditions in the above game hold and that the productivity lead of the 
leader is large, then 
(i) an industry with a relatively lower degree of appropriability does not necessarily 
grow at a slower rate; that is, an increase in the ease of spillovers or an 
improvement in the reverse engineering environment does not necessarily lead to 
a fall in the rate of innovation 
(ii) and the level of R&D effort is higher in the neck-and-neck state than in the 
unleveled state. 
Proof: 
(i) Since the maximum permissible lead is one step, we have 01 =x . Thus (26) and (27) 














1 xxxrx +Γ=++ −β                                      (38) 
Using the fact that there are only 2 states in this case, we have, using (28), 
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01 1 µµ −=                                   (39) 





+=µ                         (40) 







g +=                            (41) 
Now since *0x  and *1x  can be found by solving (37) and (38) simultaneously, we can 
derive g* only in terms of the exogenous parameters. Visual inspection of (37), (38) and    
(41) show that g* is independent of the spillover parameter b. 
(ii) Using the fact that 0Γ  > 1−Γ   and after some algebraic manipulation of (37) and (38), 
we can establish that 10 xx > .▪ 
Part (i) of Proposition 3.4.1 states that the spillover parameter b does not affect 
growth whenever the lead of one step is large enough. Part (ii) of Proposition 3.4.1 states 
that when firms are in the leveled state they have more incentive to undertake innovation 
than in any other states. Thus the usual Schumpeterian effect of more intense competition 
in the neck and neck state is outweighed by the increased incentive for firms to innovate 
in order to escape competition. Moreover, unlike the AHV model our result does not 
depend on the product differentiability parameter. Hence, we find that a competitive 
environment can stimulate R&D by increasing the incremental profit from innovating, 
that is, by strengthening the motive for neck-and-neck rivals to innovate so as to become 
the leader. Intuitively, since externalities are present only in the unleveled state and that 
the R&D level of the leader is zero in that state, the spillover rate in the model (for the 
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case of large innovative lead) becomes zero too. Since growth is driven by the innovation 
rate in the neck-and-neck state and the imitation rate of the unleveled state, it is 
independent of the spillover rate. Therefore, this proposition reinforces the case put 
forward by AHV by showing that R&D incentives are higher at the neck-and-neck state 
and that greater appropriability does not necessarily increase growth even when there are 
externalities to the leader’s R&D. 
3.6 Very Small Innovative lead 
In this section we look at the extreme opposite case of the previous section, that is 
the case in which the one step lead is small and hence, the leader does have an incentive 
to increase its lead by more than one step. Therefore, we look into eh case where 01 ≠x . 
Thus, we consider the case where 0→γ . For simplicity we assume only three states; 
state 0 which is the neck-and neck-state, state 1 where the leader has a one step lead and 
state 2 where the leader has a two step lead. Similar results can be derived for more than 
two states as will be shown in the proof Proposition 3.5.1. 
Proposition 3.5.1 
Assume that the conditions in the above game hold and that the productivity lead of the 
leader is small, then growth rate and process spillovers are positively related; that is, an 
increase in the spillover rate unambiguously leads to an increase in the growth rate. 
Proof: See Appendix 
Proposition 3.5.1 states the main result of the paper. It gives us an important long-
run relationship between imitation rate and growth at the steady state without making the 
assumption of large technology gap (large innovative lead). In this Markovian game 
between the two duopolists, with imitation and innovation as strategic variables, we 
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observe that, at any point in time, an increase in imitation rate will always prompt the 
leader to increase its innovation rate in equilibrium. Thus process imitation creates a 
source of competitive pressure which deters the leader from maximizing short run 
monopoly profit but rather “forces” him to innovate further. The mechanism driving this 
result can be observed from the construction of the proof. For a small productivity lead, 
we show that the relationship between the R&D effort of the follower and the spillover 
rate is negative since the laggard has less incentive to innovate when it can feed off the 
leader’s effort. Since, we also show that the R&D effort of the two rivals in the unleveled 
state are inversely related at the steady state, it must be the case that the leader’s 
innovation is positively related to the level of externalities.  
Thus, an increase in the spillover rate reduces the effort of the follower as it can 
free ride on the leader who, by receiving the signal that his technological advantage is 
shrinking, puts in effort to restore its lead. Proposition 3.5.1 implies that the policymaker 
can enhance the economy’s growth rate by choosing a lower level of appropriability. 
Hence, there is always (at any point in time) a follower who will prompt the leader to 
innovate further in such a market configuration, and this will lead to higher growth. It is 
also noteworthy that the above phenomenon might be due to increasing returns on the 
R&D when the gap is large.103 According to Glass (2000), an important factor in Japan’s 
recent economic slowdown has been the exhaustion of all imitation possibilities as they 




                                                 
103 See Peretto (1996) for further comments. 
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4. Conclusion 
 We have presented an analytical model that deals with process imitation and 
spillovers in a non-Schumpeterian framework. Our motivation stems mainly from the fact 
that the existing non-Schumpeterian models depend heavily on the level of competition in 
showing the interrelation between process imitation and spillovers and their impact on 
growth. Moreover, existing Schumpeterian models lack adequate empirical evidence to 
explain growth using the concept of creative destruction. Indeed, most of these studies 
rely heavily on the price undercutting mechanism of the homogeneous Bertrand game. 
We demonstrate, without relaxing the assumption of product homogeneity, that 
competitive behavior can still prevail by using a Cournot quantity competition setting. 
Two main factors drive competitive behavior in the long-run; firstly, the R&D level in 
the neck-and-neck state and, secondly, spillovers occurring due to a lack of 
appropriability. 
 Moreover, this paper can offer a basis for understanding how the dynamic 
strategic interactions between two firms with a technology gap can determine the 
economy’s growth rate when there is uncertainty. In particular, imitation acts as a spur by 
putting pressure on the industry leader to innovate further and this drives the economy’s 
engine of growth. Furthermore, this research can contribute to the literature on “The Law 
and Economics of Reverse Engineering” (see, for example, Samuelson and Scotchmer, 
2002) by providing some economic grounds in favor of process reverse engineering. In 
this regard, it demonstrates the existence of a non-Schumpeterian element in the 
innovator’s best response function. One immediate policy implication of our model is 
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that relaxing laws and regulations which hinder process imitation might not always be a 
























5.1 Derivation of the second stage quantity and profit functions 
In this section we derive (12) , (13) and Remark 3.3.1 
From (11), firm j’s problem is given by 
Max(qj)   Mqj/(qj +qi )  - cj qj   ,  j =1,2    and   i is not equal to j    (11) 
FOC for firm j is given by 
(qj +qi )M - qjM  - cj(qj +qi )2  = 0                   (A1) 
By symmetry we have, 
(qi +qj )M – qiM  - ci(qi +qj )2  = 0                   (A2) 
Simplifying gives 
 qiM  - cj(qj +qi )2  = 0                    (A3) 
 qjM  - ci(qi +qj )2  = 0                    (A4) 
Solving  (A3) and  (A4) simultaneously gives (12) 
Replacing (12) for both firms in (4) gives Pt 
Pt - cj = ci/(cj + ci)2         (A5) 
Thus the profit for firm j is given by 
(Pt - cj) qj = Пj               (A6) 
(A6) verifies (13) 
Using (6) and (13) for firm 1 we have 
П1= M(1/A2)2/(1/A2+ 1/A1)2         (A7) 
П2= M(1/A1)2/(1/A2+ 1/A1)2         (A8) 
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Now using (7), (8) on (A7) and (A8) and differentiating the result w.r.t γ  establishes the 
first part of Remark 3.3.1. Part (ii) of Remark 3.3.1 is obtained by replacing γ  =1 in (7), 











γ                           (A9) 
5.2 Derivation of the Steady State Growth rate (36) 



























ppp bxxµ  
(A11)           
The first term of the RHS of (A11) is    002 xµ  from (30). Now taking the summation on 
both sides of (32) and re-arranging we have, 




kppp xbxx µµ                             (A12) 
Replacing (A12) in (A11) and then in (A10),we have (36). 
5.3 Proof of Proposition 3.5.1 
Assume that n = 0,1,2. 
We first derive the fraction of industries in state 2, 2µ  
We know that 
1321 =++ µµµ , thus 210 1 µµµ −−=                       (A13) 
Using (31) and (32) we have the stationarity condition 
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( ) 001111 2 xbxxx µµ =++            and          (A14) 
( ) 112222 xbxxx µµ =++  ,                             (A15) 
Solving (A13)-(A15) simultaneously gives 







++++++=µ                              (A16) 
 
Thus, 
201 1 µµµ −−= *                       (A17) 
Now by solving for 0µ  as we did for Proposition 3.4.1, we derive the growth rate also in 
similar fashion and it is given by104 








−++= µ                                   (A18) 
Now it can be shown105 that the partial derivative of g in (A18) w.r.t  to b, 0x , 1x  and 1x  
are all positive as long as the partial derivative of 2µ * w.r.t  to b, 0x , 1x  and 1x  are small 
enough. We next solve (26) and (27) to find 1x * in terms of b, 0x  and other exogenous 










Γ−++++=Ω xxbxr  and 201 x+Γ=Λ −  
                                                 







the proof can be extended for the case of more than one state. 
105 Proof can be provided upon request. 
125 
It can be shown106 that the partial derivatives of 1x * w.r.t b, 0x and 1x  are negative
107 and 
thus, by chain rule the partial derivatives of 0x * and 1x * w.r.t b must be positive. We can 


























sgnsgn              (A20) 
It can be shown108 that the RHS of (A20) is always positive as long as 
db
xdx 11 ≥  which 














                                                 
106 Proof can be provided upon request. 
107 Note that although 1x  is not present in (A19), we can still deduce this relationship since we know from 
(26) that 1x  and 0x  are positively related. 
108 Proof can be provided upon request. 
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V. A Strategic Analysis of Product and Process Innovation with Spillovers 
 
                                                                 
Abstract 
  
 In this paper we propose a conceptual framework for analyzing how process 
spillovers can impact on a firm’s decision to choose its levels of process and product 
innovation. In contrast to previous works which consider the interrelation between 
process and product R&D in a duopoly with no spillovers, we introduce process 
spillovers into the framework. A two-stage analysis of a noncooperative game which 
entails both demand enhancing product innovation and cost-reducing process innovation 
in an asymmetric duopoly is developed. While the leader’s technological efficiency 
depends only on its own R&D investment, the follower’s productivity depends also on 
the level of intra-industry spillovers. In the first stage the duopolists choose their levels of 
product and process innovations, while in the second stage they compete in the product 
market. The results obtained confirm the findings highlighted by previous studies that 
both product and process innovations are strategic substitutes. A new result is that it is 
always optimal for the firms to invest more in product innovations when the rate of 
spillover falls. 
 
Keywords: Product and Process Innovation, R&D, Process Spillovers, Imitation. 












It has been established that both product and process innovations play important roles 
in determining the competitiveness and performance of firms in various industries. 
Indeed, studies by Athey and Schmutzler (1995) and Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) highlight 
the importance of distinguishing between process and product innovations in two-stage 
non-cooperative R&D games.109 Increasing attention has also been given to the potential 
for R&D spillovers impacting on the technology of firms. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
found that, in contrast to the traditional result, intra-industry spillovers may encourage 
equilibrium industry R&D investment.110 Nadiri (1993) and Mohnen (1996) have 
considered a more general form of such externalities. Nevertheless, the extent to which 
R&D spillovers affect product and process innovations in a framework where strategic 
interaction is present remains a subject of relatively less attention for which there has not 
been formal theoretical modeling. Our study is primarily motivated by this apparent 
absence in the existing literature. Few empirical studies highlight the distinct role of 
R&D spillovers in influencing product and process innovation decisions. For example, 
Ornaghi (2002) proposed a new empirical approach to assess the impact of knowledge 
spillovers on product and process innovation.111 
It has been observed that the relationship between spillovers and R&D incentives 
has two aspects. First, in many industries, firms undertake R&D investments in order to 
develop new products or processes. One feature of R&D investment that distinguishes 
                                                 
109 While Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) study the relationship between the size of firms and their decisions 
about product and process R&D, Athey and Schmutzler (1995) look at the relationship between the firms’ 
short-run decision variables and their long run decisions about product and process flexibility. 
110 Cohen and Levinthal formally study the two opposing effects of spillovers on the R&D incentives of 
firms. 
111 Ornaghi (2002) found that the technological diffusion of product innovation is larger than the one driven 
by process innovation. 
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itself from other forms of investment is that firms which do the investing are often not 
able to exclude others from freely benefiting from their investments. Thus the benefits 
from R&D investments spill over to other firms in the economy.112 Since the laggards can 
improve their own technology by free-riding on the leader’s research, technologically 
more advanced firms might have a disincentive to undertake further research since their 
productivity lead might be significantly reduced in the presence of such spillovers. 
Hence, the first characteristic of R&D spillovers is that it can potentially reduce research 
incentives. The second aspect of spillovers is related to the concept of “escape 
competition”.113 When the laggard firms benefit from process R&D spillovers, they 
improve their own technology and thereby reduce the technology gap114 between the 
leader and themselves. As a result, there will emerge competitive pressure on the leader 
to innovate further to maintain its lead. These two opposing forces of spillovers on R&D 
are observed in the empirical findings of Cohen and Levinthal (1989).115 Given the 
importance of spillovers in the strategic interactions between firms investing in process 
and product R&D, we allow both of them to play a major role in our model. 
However, if process spillovers are incorporated into the existing theoretical 
framework, the interrelation between product and process R&D is rendered inherently 
more complex.116 While the literature on R&D with product and/or process innovations 
have pointed out how a two-stage non-cooperative game can help to explore the R&D 
                                                 
112 Griliches (1979) emphasized the significance of spillovers in modeling and estimating the effects of 
R&D investments. 
113 “Escape competition’ refers to the motive of innovating in order to escape competition. 
114 Cameron (1999) found that there are more free-riding or imitation possibilities when the technology gap 
is large than when it is low. 
115 Cohen and Levinthal found, contrary to previous studies, that intra-industry spillovers may encourage 
rather than deter R&D investment. 
116 Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) recognized this difficulty in characterizing an implicit form Nash 
equilibrium in the R&D game in which there are both process and product innovations. 
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incentives of a firm deciding to undertake either product or process innovations, they 
downplay the role of process spillovers in the firm’s investment decisions. This suggests 
potential theoretical limitations in the study of R&D investment and its determinants. In 
addition, the existing empirical analysis by Ornaghi (2002) shows clearly that there exists 
some evidence that spillovers affect product and process innovavtion at least in 
manufacturing industries. Therefore the relationship between product and process 
innovation, in a two-stage non-cooperative R&D game setting, when externalities are 
present ought to be determined. Also, the results of Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) ignored 
the existence of such spillovers. Thus, some new findings on the interrelation between 
product and process innovation and spillovers can be found in this new setting. 
The objective of this paper is to offer a conceptual framework for understanding 
the role played by spillovers in determining the optimal product and process innovation 
in a duopoly with a leader-follower configuration. A central concern is to address the 
question of whether higher spillovers favor more process or more product innovations. 
We develop a two-stage non-cooperative R&D game of process and product innovation 
in a duopoly model which is distinct from Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) in the following 
way. Unlike the latter, we allow for process spillovers from which only the follower 
benefits in the model so that the follower’s marginal cost of production is reduced not 
only by its own process innovation but also by a fraction of the leader’s process 
investment.117 At the first stage of the game, the duopolists (the leader and the follower) 
will engage in product and process R&D. While product R&D is stochastic (in the sense 
that it realizes with a probability) and leads to the instantaneous discovery of a new 
product which leads to an outward shift of the firm’s demand schedule, process R&D 
                                                 
117 This follows from D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1989). 
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reduces the marginal cost of production with certainty.118 The two firms compete in the 
product market in the second stage. As in Yin and Zuscovitch (1998), results are derived 
by assuming that in the first stage the firm chooses product innovation taking process 
innovation as given and vice versa and finally the impact of spillovers on product and 
process strategies is found. 
Our results show that the spillover rate plays a critical role in analyzing the 
interplay between process and product innovations. Specifically we find that when 
spillovers are high, the firms will invest less in product innovation. Thus a negative 
relationship prevails between product innovation and spillovers. One natural 
interpretation that emerges from this result is that when the spillover rate falls, there are 
fewer imitation possibilities available to the follower. Thus the extent to which the 
laggard is able to free ride on the leader is reduced and it becomes optimal for the former 
to change its strategy by increasing its product innovation. Our results also show that Yin 
and Zuscovitch’s (1998) findings, that the product/process innovation rates of the two 
firms are strategic substitutes, remain robust when spillovers are introduced into the 
model. Hence, while the results remain unchanged in our new setting, we are also able to 
give some insights as to when it is optimal for a firm to change its strategy from process 
to product innovation. 
One immediate policy implication is that greater appropriability in an industry 
might not always be a “good” thing if higher innovation rates improve social welfare. In 
particular, if an increase in the spillover rate can lead to an increase in the process 
innovation rates (due to relatively less product innovation) of both firms, then the overall 
                                                 
118 The asymmetry is observed by the difference in the marginal cost schedules of the two firms and by the 
process spillovers from which only the follower benefits. 
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industry’s level of R&D will also rise. Thus our model, by helping us to identify the 
effects of spillovers or the ease of imitation on the innovation rate, also addresses some 
issues in the area of “The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering”. Handa (1995) 
and Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) recognized that it is difficult to find an 
economically sound argument to justify the restriction or the legalizing of the act of 
reverse engineering.119Our analysis sheds some light on the ongoing debate as to whether 
or not restricting the act of reverse engineering is justifiable on economic grounds. We 
believe that in an industry where reverse engineering can speed up the diffusion of 
technology via process spillovers, the strategic interaction between rival firms will 
guarantee that a competitive environment always prevails. Furthermore, the leader does 
not have an incentive to sit back as a monopolist as its technological lead might dissipate 
in this setting. Hence, is welfare is always enhanced by more competition. 
Our model is closest to Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) who show that different 
innovation incentives might cause the larger firm to invest more in process innovations 
and the smaller firm to allocate more resources to product innovations. They use a two- 
stage game model in a duopoly setting, in which product innovation is stochastic and 
instantaneous while process innovation is incremental. Their results, which are also 
consistent with empirical findings, show that the large firm will be a leader in process 
innovation while the small firm will be a leader in product innovation. They therefore 
conclude that the structure of R&D expenditure should be taken into consideration 
together with the conventional R&D investment level. We extend their model by 
allowing the laggard to benefit from process spillovers by free riding on the leader’s 
                                                 
119 See Samuelson and Scotchmer (2002) for more details. 
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process innovation and we derive a new result in which both firms find it optimal to 
invest in product innovations in an industry where the spillover rate is falling. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of 






















2.1 Model Overview 
An asymmetric duopoly model of technological competition in cost-reducing 
process and demand enhancing product innovation is proposed, where reference will be 
made to a leader (with a lower marginal cost of production) and a follower. Thus there 
are two forms of R&D activity – product and process. A firm is said to undertake process 
innovations if it employs some resources to reduce its marginal cost of production. While 
the leader’s cost is reduced only by its own investment level, the laggard’s cost is reduced 
by a positive fraction120 of the leader’s investment level in addition to its own investment 
level. A firm is said to undertake product innovations if it successfully introduces a new 
product which instantaneously increases its demand schedule (given that it continues to 
sell the original product). Product innovation is uncertain and episodic. This proposed 
analysis of product and process R&D in duopolistic competition entails sequential 
decisions which can be treated as two distinct stages in a noncooperative game; product 
and process R&D decisions by competing duopolists are made at the first stage and 
product market competition at the second stage. We use the standard methodology of 
backward induction to solve the game. Results are derived from the first stage process 
and product reaction functions of the two firms by assuming that each firm can undertake 




2.2 Formal Model 
                                                 
120 We shall formally define this fraction as the spillover rate. 
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  As in Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) we consider an asymmetric duopoly in which 
initially both firms produce a homogeneous product a  with constant marginal costs c . 
Each firm face the following linear demand schedule 
( )21 aaa qqmlp +−=                         (1) 
where ap    and  aiq  are the price and quantities respectively and l  and m are positive 
constants. Each firm spend ( )isf  dollars to search for a new product b with a probability 
of success [ ]1,0∈is   and spend ( )irg  to reduce their unit cost c  by ir . Thus cost-
reducing innovation is non-stochastic and incremental while product innovation is 
uncertain and instantaneous. In particular as in Yin and Zuscovitch (1998), we assume 
that as soon as the new product is introduced into the market, the inverse demand 
schedule for both commodities become  
( ) ( )2121 jjiii qqnqqmlp +−+−=      , jibaji ≠= ;,, 121              (2) 
The effective marginal costs of firms 1 and 2 after process cost-reductions are given 
respectively by 
11 rcC −=                         (3) 
122 rrcC β−−=                        (4) 
where ( )1,0∈β  
                                                 
121 Naturally, 0>> nm  implies that the two goods are substitutes and that the price elasticity of demand 
for each good is greater than their cross elasticity of demand. 
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Assume 21 CC < , then firm 1 is the leader and firm 2 is the follower. We formally define 
the technology gap between the two firms by 
12 CCX −≡    122         (5) 
β  represents the spillover rate which the follower benefits from the leader. (3) and (4) 
characterize the one-way spillover structure of the model. Our definition of spillovers is 
similar to Cohen and Levinthal (1989) together with some extensions. In particular, we 
define spillovers to include valuable knowledge generated in the research process of the 
leader and which becomes accessible to the follower if and only if the latter is reverse 
engineering the innovator’s research process.123 Given that spillovers favor imitation, it 
becomes a better strategy for the follower to imitate by feeding off the leader’s 
innovation at least initially. Thus, the follower is necessarily an imitator. 








i rrf =                     (7) 
 In the first stage, each firm simultaneously determines their product and process 
innovation strategies is  and ir  respectively. They then engage in Cournot competition in 
the product markets in the second stage of the game. We solve the game by backward 
induction. The equilibrium concept is the standard subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. 
                                                 
122 It can be shown easily that ( ) 211 rrX −−= β . 
123 We, however, assume the follower incurs a fixed cost when undertaking reverse engineering. Such costs 
do not affect R&D decisions since they vanish when the first order conditions are found. 
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2.3 Second Stage 
 As in Yin and Zuscovitch’s (1998) model, the total profit function for firm i in the 
second stage subgame is 
( ) ( ) ( ) bibaiiaii qcpqCpCq −+−=,rπ       for i=1,2    (8) 
where ( )2121 ,,, bbaa qqqqq =r   is the output vector and iC  is given by (3) and (4). Since 
product innovation is stochastic, it is possible that 0=is . Hence, there are four possible 
outcomes in the first stage subgame. (i) Both firms succeed in introducing the new 
product; (ii) firm i succeeds but its rival fails; (iii) firm i fails but its rival succeeds; (iv) 
both firms fail. We also let ( )4,...1== kqkr , the equilibrium output of the four above 
cases as in Yin and Zuscovitch (1998). It can be shown that the equilibrium output and 
prices are:124 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ){ }0,3/2max 221 nmclnClmClmq jiai −−−−−−=                       (9) 








clpb +=                         (11) 
( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( ){ }0,3/16/34max 22222 mCnmmclmnClnmq jiai −−−−−−−=          (12)               












b ++−−=                       (14) 








−−−=      ;        03 =biq                          (15) 
                                                 


























a CClp ++=                                (18) 
We shall consider only interior solutions. The total (sum of the profits made for each 
product) profit function for firm i for each of the four cases are given as follows125. 
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+=π                                   (22) 
where ii ClA −=   for i,j , clA −= and ij CCX −=    
 
2.4 First Stage 
The first stage payoff for firm i is  
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )iiijijiijijijijii rgsfssssssrrssV −−−+−+−+= 4321 111,,, ππππ  (23) 
We analyze the R&D choice by looking at the first stage reaction functions of the firms. 
As in Yin and Zuscovitch’s model we shall consider product or process innovation, 
                                                 
125 Derivations can be provided upon request. 
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assuming the other R&D strategies are exogenously given, that is; each firm can only 
choose the level of one strategy at any point in time.126 
Proposition 2.4.1 
Assume that the conditions of the above game hold, then the product innovations of the 
two firms are strategic substitutes; that is, are an increase in one firm’s investment in 
product R&D reduces its rival’s investment  in product R&D. 
Proof: 
We rewrite (23) as  




−−−+−+−+ }111{1 4321 θπθπθπθπθ    (24) 
Using (6), (7), taking the first derivative of (23) w.r.t is and re-arranging, we have the 








−+=       where ( )2236 nmm −=θ                   (25) 
But since ii 12 ππ > , a negative relationship between is and js holds.▪ 
Proposition 2.4.2 
Assume that the conditions of the above game hold, then the process innovations of the 
two firms are strategic substitutes; that is, an increase in one firm’s investment in process 
R&D reduces its rival’s investment in process R&D. 
Proof: 
Owing to the asymmetry in the cost structure of the two firms, we derive their reaction 
functions separately. 
                                                 
126 Unlike Yin and Zuscovitch (1998), we do not emphasize the existence and stability of the Nash 
equilibrium in this game as we only use the reaction functions to derive results. Moreover, we  
do not compare the strategic behavior of a large firm with that of a small firm. 
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We rewrite (23) as  




−−−+−+−+ }111{1 4321 θπθπθπθπθ    (26) 
Using (6), (7), (19)-(22) and taking the first derivative of (26) w.r.t ir for i=1, 2, we have 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
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and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )

















jθ          
                               (28) 
where XAZ i += and jAXY −= 127 
Now, after simplifying and re-arranging (27), we compare the coefficients of ir and jr in 
the reduced form of the reaction function. Since the coefficients are of opposite sign, a 
negative relationship between ir and jr holds. Analogous methods are used on (28) and 
again we find that a negative relationship between ir and jr holds. ▪ 
 Proposition 2.4.1 and Proposition 2.4.2 show that the two R&D activities (process 
and product) are strategic substitutes. They show that the results of Yin and Zuscovitch 
(1998) remain robust in a framework with externalities. (See Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) 
for the economic rationale for the above propositions.) 
Proposition 2.4.3 
                                                 
127 Derivatives of these two terms with respect to ir  are also found. A detailed proof can be provided upon 
request. 
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21  and 
22 nm − is small, then is and js are negatively related toβ ; that is, if the follower’s 
process R&D is bounded and the two products are close substitutes, then the product 
innovations of both the leader and the follower decrease with the spillover rate. 
Proof: 
Owing to the asymmetry in the cost structure of the two firms, we have to consider (25) 
for i=1,2. 
Thus we have 


















β        
                                     (29)    
A similar expression is derived for βd
dsi . It can be shown that if 22 nm − is small, 
1)( >− ilikd











k >− )(  and iilik s>− )( θπθπ                              (30) 
We next derive β
π
d
d ik  for all k and I using (19) –(22).128 




21 is a sufficient condition for both 
0≤βd
dsi  for i=1,2.129 This completes the proof. ▪ 
                                                 
128 Derivations can be provided upon request. 
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 Proposition 2.4.3 gives us an important relationship between product innovation 
and the spillover rate. It tells us that a fall in the spillover rate might imply that firms 
might switch from process to product innovations.130 Intuitively, the spillover rate starts 
to fall when the follower has exhausted all possible benefits from free-riding off the 
leader’s process innovations. As a result, the laggard, who is now left with less free-
riding opportunities, has no other alternatives than to change its strategy by undertaking 
more product innovations. The leader would then respond to the laggard’s move by also 
increasing its product innovation so that it can maintain its market share lead. Hence, a 
decrease in the spillover rate raises both the leader’s and the follower’s levels of product 
innovation and this leads to an increase in the industry’s level of product innovations. 
One policy implication which emerges from this result is that greater appropriability and 
laws which prohibit reverse engineering by restricting technological diffusion might not 
always improve social welfare since process innovations fall although product 
innovations increase. 
 On the normative side, another possible interpretation of our result is that firms 
might switch from process to product innovation when the technology gap becomes 
small. Cameron (1999) found that there are more free-riding or imitation possibilities 
when the technology gap is large than when it is small. Thus there might be decreasing 
returns to scale to imitation. It is therefore possible that owing to such decreasing 
marginal benefits, the follower might find it optimal to switch from process to product 
innovation, with the leader responding to it to maintain its lead. Hence, if the technology 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 Full details of the proof can be provided upon request. 
130 Note that “switch” should be interpreted as the decision of the firm to choose more of one strategy and 
less of the other rather than reducing one strategy to zero. 
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gap dynamics of an industry can be observed, one can determine when an industry’s 
innovations will shift from product to process. 
 The results of Bonanno and Haworth (1998) that Cournot competition favors cost-
reducing innovations is likely to corroborate our findings that process spillovers do not 
hinder process innovations. However, the reader is cautioned that the framework of 
vertical differentiation described in their paper may not be directly comparable to ours; 



















 One possible limitation of the existing literature on the interrelation between 
product and process innovations in two-stage non-cooperative R&D games is the 
assumption that technological diffusion does not take place between the leader and the 
follower of the industry. Indeed, the previous work by Yin and Zuscovitch (1998) 
considers the case where process innovations have no externalities. We augment the latter 
framework by incorporating process spillovers. We consider the case of one-way 
spillovers whereby only the follower can benefit from the leader and not vice-versa. The 
central contribution of our work is to offer a conceptual model for determining the impact 
of spillovers on the industry’s innovation level and also for understanding the factors 
which might cause a firm to change its strategy from process to product when the 
spillover rate becomes small. Our results demonstrate that there exists a negative 
relationship between the spillover parameter and the product innovations of both the 
leader and follower. This suggests that we may observe switching behavior in an industry 
when the spillover rate becomes small. 
 The model proposed in this paper can offer a basis for determining whether policy 
makers should always aim at increasing the level of appropriability in industries as has 
been done conventionally. In particular, we offer some economic arguments against the 
restriction of the act of reverse engineering. Promising directions for further 
investigations include the extension of our model to incorporate product spillovers as 
well, and the endogenizing of the spillover rate by allowing it to depend on the 




VI. General Conclusions  
 
This dissertation has attempted to provide a contribution to expanding the 
literature on both the theory and application of noncooperative R&D by introducing a 
class of games in which asymmetric spillovers are determined by the level of technology 
of the players. In particular, we consider the case where the follower is more likely to 
benefit from such spillovers as compared to the industry leader.  
The first essay provides a general framework in which to analyze the relationship 
between R&D investment and technology catch-up in a differential game and shows that 
the dynamics of the technology gap play a crucial role in determining whether spillovers 
necessarily reduce the leader’s incentives to invest in R&D. The results provide a 
sufficient condition for the existence of a steady state in R&D games with spillovers; a 
finding that is new in the literature. 
The second essay presents an application of the theoretical framework by 
studying the effects of process spillovers on competition in a R&D based endogenous 
growth model. It finds, firstly, that the innovation strategies of the two firms can be 
dynamically strategic complements if a large technology gap prevails and, secondly, that 
there is a case for process reverse engineering as a fall in the level of appropriability may 
result in higher growth.  
The purpose of the third essay is to determine the effects of process R&D 
spillovers on growth by extending the well-known AHV framework. It demonstrates, 
without relaxing the assumption of product homogeneity, that competitive behavior can 
still prevail in a Cournot quantity competition setting. Two main factors drive 
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competitive behavior in the long-run; firstly, the R&D levels in the neck-and-neck state 
and, secondly, spillovers occurring due to a lack of appropriability.  
The final essay offers a conceptual framework for understanding the role played 
by spillovers in determining the optimal product and process innovation in a duopoly 
with a leader-follower configuration. It addresses the question of whether higher 
spillovers favor more process or more product innovation and contributes to the existing 
literature by showing that it is always optimal for firms to invest more in product 
innovations when the rate of spillover falls. 
This dissertation can contribute to the literature on “The Law and Economics of 
Reverse Engineering”. By providing some economic grounds in favor of process reverse 
engineering, this dissertation has extended the existing literature on “Law and Economics 
of Reverse Engineering” by demonstrating the existence of a non-Schumpeterian element 
in the innovator’s best response function. One immediate policy implication of the result 
is that laws and regulations which hinder process imitation might not always be a good 
thing in an industry characterized by spillovers since they might lead to lower economic 
growth. 
From a theoretical perspective, some directions for further investigation include 
the extension of our analysis to a cooperative setting with research joint ventures (as has 
been done traditionally for the static and exogenous spillover case). Also, proper 
characterization of the stability conditions that would guarantee a Saddle Path in our 
general class of R&D game models is an avenue for further inquiry. A closed-looped 
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